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NOTES
FROM PUBLIC SQUARE TO MARKET SQUARE:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIRST AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Julie Marie Baworowsky*
INTRODUCTION
In an era of globalization, an accurate model of the corporation
should recognize corporations' social roles and responsibilities. Con-
sumers who appreciate the potential effects of their spending choices
are more likely to patronize companies in line with their moral senti-
ments.' Many consumers desire that trade be both free and fair, that
prices be low, and that manufacturers be socially responsible actors. 2
Recognizing that their business success depends upon building sound
communal relationships, corporations are seeking new ways to make
social responsibility part of their identities.3
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Politics and
Theology and Religious Studies, The Catholic University of America, 2006. The
author thanks all those who helped with this Note, including Professor Richard W.
Garnett and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review.
1 See Stefano Zamagni, Professor, Univ. of Bologna, Keynote Address at the Ford-
ham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law Symposium: Religious Values and Cor-
porate Decision Making: An Economist's Perspective (Feb. 23, 2004), in 11 FORDHAM
J. CoR. & FIN. L. 573, 577-78 (2006).
2 See id. at 581. See generally Anthony Scaperlanda, John Paul I's Vision of the Role
of Multinational Enterprise Expansion in Building the Social Economy, 25 INT'L J. Soc.
ECON. 1764, 1768 (1998) (explaining different ways business choices can affect the
public welfare).
3 Cf Leo L. Clarke et al., The Practical Soul of Business Ethics: The Corporate Man-
ager's Dilemma and the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church, 29 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 139,
163 (2005) (discussing models for corporate executives willing to introduce ethical
change);JenniferJ. Griffin &John F. Mahon, The Corporate Social Performance and Car-
porate Financial Performance Debate: Twenty-Five Years of Incomparable Research, 36 Bus. &
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One way for corporations to increase their corporate social
responsibility is through the adoption of a religious identity.4 Pros
and cons attach to this proposal.5 But, given the existing regulations
of corporations, is corporate religious identity a realistic or desirable
possibility?6 This issue has gained new importance with recent legisla-
tion that silences corporations' religious expression and prevents the
Soc'v 5, 26 (1997) (arguing that financial performance positively correlates with
social and moral responsibility); Zamagni, supra note 1, at 577-78 (claiming that
"businesses succeed in as much as they are able to respond to multiple secondary
objectives not limited to the profit motive").
4 See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56
CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 31-44 (2006) (arguing that welcoming religious discourse within
the corporation can encourage corporations to act "beyond" their own self-interest,
along with other benefits to the corporation and society); Michael Naughton, The
Corporation as a Community of Work: Understanding the Firm Within the Catholic Social Tra-
dition, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 33, 42 (2006) (arguing that conscientious business leader-
ship stems from theology and philosophy); Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote
Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 873-78 (2004) (describing how
different religions urge businesses to consider the common good); Tim M. Lowder,
New Dimensions of Corporate Culture: A Construct for Stakeholder Ethics in a Spiritual Work-
place 20 (Capella Univ., Paper No. 0M7050, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-916740 (considering how spiritual workplaces
incorporate community stakeholders in decisionmaking); David A. Skeel, Jr., Christi-
anity and the Large Scale Corporation 18 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal The-
ory Series, Research Paper No. 0745, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=1025959 (" [I]t took more than the law to create large scale corporations, and
it will take a lot more than law to sustain them.").
5 See, e.g., Luigino Bruni & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Corporate Deci-
sion Making: The Economy of Communion Project, 11 FoRDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 645,
651-57 (2006) (concluding that "business endeavors may express religious commit-
ments" to serve the poor by way of a case study of more than seven hundred spiritually
based "Economy of Communion" businesses in America and the world's poorest cit-
ies); Timothy L. Fort, Religious Belief Corporate Leadership, and Business Ethics, 33 AM.
Bus. L.J. 451, 452 (1996) (summarizing business literature to show "[r]eligious convic-
tions provide some business leaders with a strong motivation for conducting business
ethically even when their profit motive might not"); Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 32 (believing that the only "social responsibility of business" is "'to increase
its profits'").
6 See Posting of Rob Vischer to Mirror of Justice, http://www.mirrorofjustice.
blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2004/02/conference on-r l.html (Feb. 23, 2004, 15:59)
("Provided that religious values are brought to bear in a transparent fashion, what is
the objection to their entry? I can see why religious values may be inefficient or other-
wise ill-suited to the corporate context, but is there any good-faith basis for precluding
them categorically?").
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use of religion to increase corporate social responsibility,7 like the
New Jersey Workers' Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act
(WFEJA).
8
This Note aims to explain how corporate religious expression fits
into new regulations, traditional corporate theories, and constitu-
tional law, a convergence that scholars have not yet considered.9 It
examines whether corporate religious expression should receive con-
stitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause1 0 and under the First Amendment's Speech Clause."
This Note argues that corporate religious expression, be it verbal or
conduct-based, is protected under overlooked free speech doctrines.
In contrast, Free Exercise Clause1 2 claims and the more complicated
Speech Clause claims for expressive association rights' 3 are fraught
with difficulty for the commercial entity.' 4 Therefore, civil rights
attorneys litigating corporations' religious claims should consider
bringing more Speech Clause claims.
To advance the debate surrounding corporate religious expres-
sion, Part I begins by summarizing current regulations affecting cor-
porate religious speech and by describing the benefits of exploring
constitutional protection for corporate religious speech. Part II exam-
ines whether the three main theoretical explanations of the corpora-
tion encourage legal protection of corporate religious speech. This
Note rejects two theories denying corporate religious speech rights
7 This Note uses the term "corporation" to refer to an association incorporated
for the purpose-among other possible purposes-of deriving profit from its
activities.
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-9 to -14 (West Supp. 2007); see infra notes 22-39 and
accompanying text.
9 SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 2, 23 (commenting on the lack of consideration
given to religion in corporate law scholarship).
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ....").
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech . . ").
12 Id. ("Congress shall make no law .. . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].").
13 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-57 (2000) (delineating
the extent of expressive association rights).
14 See Roberts v. U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634-35 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that a commercial entity has minimal, if any, freedom of association
rights); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding no free exercise defense to a religious discrimination lawsuit against a Chris-
tian company requiring employees to attend Bible study meetings). The uncertainty
of legal protection in these controversial areas makes a Speech Clause avenue more
valuable. See infra Parts IB, I1.B-D.
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(artificial entity and contractarian) as outmoded conceptions no
longer applicable to modern corporations. It finds that the natural
entity is the only theory accurately describing modern corporations
and supporting corporate religious speech rights. Part III discusses
how the First and Fourteenth Amendments may protect corporate
religious speech. It illustrates how corporate theories have affected
Supreme Court speech cases, draws analogies from precedents pro-
tecting corporate political speech, and shows how a variety of free
speech theories justify corporate religious speech protection. It then
urges society to act on its commitment to religious pluralism by mak-
ing room in the marketplace for groups who want to conduct business
without shedding their religious identities.
This Note ultimately concludes that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments should protect corporate religious speech from statu-
tory regulation.
I. THE NEw IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Corporate religious speech is poised to assume a new importance
in Speech Clause jurisprudence because government regulation is
increasingly likely to impinge on corporate religious identity. Under-
standing how regulations threaten corporate religious speech and
examining available defenses to regulations will promote greater clar-
ity in the law. Such certainty will lessen the risk that an unconstitu-
tional statute will discourage religious corporations from the exercise
of their rights.
A. Corporate Religious Speech Regulations Today
Corporate religious Speech Clause violations arise from both
direct and indirect regulations of speech. Indirect regulation of relig-
ious speech occurs when a form of expressive religious conduct con-
flicts with a statutory scheme. 15 Compliance with laws requiring
corporations to act in a certain way can force corporations to express
lawmakers' moral and religious stances. This happens in many cases
also involving the violation of the right to exercise one's religion
freely. In contrast, a direct regulation of corporate religious speech
occurs when a legislature singles out corporate religious speech for
special restrictions, like WFEIA does. 16
15 See infra Part III.B-D (discussing First Amendment protections for expressive
religious conduct).
16 NewJersey Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act, NJ. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34:19-9 to -14 (West Supp. 2007).
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For example, California's current requirement that an unwilling
party, Catholic Charities, must provide employee insurance coverage
for contraception indirectly forces the charity to communicate the
state's religious message.17 Catholic Charities maintained in litigation
challenging California's law that the requirement interferes with Cath-
olic Charities' religious exercise "because the [Roman Catholic]
Church considers contraception a sin, and because Catholic Charities
believes it cannot offer insurance for prescription contraceptives with-
out improperly facilitating that sin."1 8 However, the charity over-
looked its potential Speech Clause claims in its lawsuit. A state-
compelled communication of moral support for contraceptive use was
forced upon the charity by California when the state required the
charity to provide contraceptive insurance coverage. 19 The law also
silenced the charity's previous message of protest and opposition to
contraceptives. Before the new law, the charity's objections were con-
veyed symbolically by its refusal to provide coverage.
Another example of a regulation that can both compel and
silence expressive religious corporate conduct is a law that requires
pharmacies to dispense contraceptives and abortifacients. 20 Dispens-
ing a prescription involves the pharmacy's communication of its pro-
fessional judgment that the product will benefit the patient.
Pharmaceutical professionals must offer written advice and oral coun-
seling about the benefits and safe use of their prescriptions. 21 Statutes
17 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91
(Cal. 2004) ("We do not doubt Catholic Charities' assertion that to offer insurance
coverage for prescription contraceptives to its employees would be religiously unac-
ceptable."); Richard W. Garnett, Confine & Conquer: The California Supreme Court and
Religious Freedom, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/garnett200403030850.asp ("The Catholic Charities case .... involves an
effort to define-and thereby confine-the nature and scope of religious belief, obli-
gation, and faith."). California law considers Catholic Charities a corporation. See
Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 75.
18 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 75.
19 See id. at 102 (Brown, J., dissenting) (calling the regulation "an intentional,
purposeful intrusion into a religious organization's expression of its religious tenets
and sense of mission").
20 See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 867 N.E.2d 1164, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(dismissing for want of ripeness a pharmacy's state free exercise clause claim for relief
from a regulation requiring the dispensing of contraceptive products); see also
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, No. C07-5374RBL, 2007 WL 3358121, at *4-6, *10 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 2007) (presenting a successful federal Free Exercise Clause claim based
upon similar facts and describing the public boycott of a plaintiff pharmacy refusing
to give patients the abortifacient "Plan B").
21 See Stormans, 2007 WL 3358121, at *4-6 (describing a pharmacy's professional
and legal obligations).
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that require contraceptive sales compel a pharmacy to send a symbolic
message to patients that the pharmacy has no concerns that the con-
traceptives will harm patients-even if in fact the pharmacy finds
moral or religious grounds to think contraceptive use is harmful.
Imposition of these sales statutes additionally can censor the symbolic
message of religious objection a pharmacy may previously have made
through a historical refusal to stock contraceptives. What is more, by
forcing sales, the state compels the pharmacy's verbal or written
endorsement of contraceptives through the advice a pharmacy must
provide to a patient about benefits and safe use (even if the pharmacy
considers contraceptive use harmful to the patient in a holistic sense).
On top of this, a conscientiously objecting pharmacy, which in the
past may have wished to be verbally silent on the issue of contracep-
tives, now could be placed in the position of being forced to speak
and explain its refusal to comply with the law to patients.
In contrast to these indirect regulations of corporate religious
speech, New Jersey's WFEIA adopts the direct regulatory route.
22
Originally model legislation drafted by the AFL-CIO, 23 WFEIA's con-
cern is to protect workers from intimidation, indoctrination, and con-
finement. As enacted in New Jersey, WFEIA forbids employers from
requiring their employees to hear the employer's religious opinions at
meetings or in any other form of communication. 24 Under WFEIA,
an employer may only communicate its religious opinions if it proffers
22 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-9 to -14 (West Supp. 2007). The Act does not limit
the regulation to corporations but instead restricts the speech of any entity that pays
an employee. See id. § 34:19-9. This definition applies more to corporations than to
any other kind of employer. For a discussion of the federal labor law preemption
issues involved in this legislation, see Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-
Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29
COMp. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 209, 211 (2008) ("[C]ourts should find that such state laws
are not preempted by the NLRA.").
23 See AFL-CIO, Fighting for Workers' Rights, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legis-
lativealert/stateissues/workersrights.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
24 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-10 to -12. It is important to note that this legisla-
tion targets the religious speech of businesses and corporations who hire and pay
employees, not the corporations' officials or supervisors expressing personal views.
See Letter from Charles Wowkanech, President, N.J. State AFL-CIO, and Laurel Bren-
nan, Sec'y-Treasurer, N.J. State AFL-CIO, to Members of the New Jersey State Senate
Labor Committee (Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://www.njaflcio.org/files/njaflcio/
File/legislation/S-1123.pdf (implying that the statute only prohibits the opinions of
the corporation). But see Janice Dubler, More Protections for Employees in NJ: "Worker
Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act," BARRISTER, Oct. 2006, at 8, available at
http://www.mmwr.com/Uploads/FileManager/more-protection-fjornj-employees.
pdf (construing statute to include supervisor speech). The statute also regulates cor-
porate political speech. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-10.
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a waiver informing employees of their right to refuse to attend each
such meeting or listen to each such communication-and if the
employee then consents to each communication or meeting. 25 Since
a corporation can hardly act or speak without the involvement of its
employees, WFEIA places all corporate religious expression under the
veto power of each employee.
26
Title VII, a federal civil rights-era statute, already directly bans
many of the less socially valuable religious communications prohibited
under WFELA. 27 Rather than targeting all corporate religious expres-
sion as WFELA does, Title VII prohibits direct or indirect religious dis-
crimination by an employer in the workplace. 28 As a result, when a
corporation discriminates on the basis of religion, for example, by
requiring employees to sign a "corporate prayer," the corporation vio-
lates both Title VII and WFEIA.29 Likewise, Title VII and WFEIA
could block a religious corporation that prefers faith healing from dis-
25 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-10. When NewJersey GovernorJon Corzine signed
WFEIA on July 26, 2006, his signing statement indicated he understood the bill's
application more narrowly, as concerning only interactive communications, and not
e-mail communications. See Statement of Governor Jon Corzine upon Signing the
Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act (July 26, 2006), available at http:
//www.njbia.org/bills/072706a.pdf. The proper construction is open to debate
because this statute has never been litigated. But cf Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v.
Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 313-16 (6th Cir. 1998) (striking down a state campaign statute
requiring that corporations who want to discuss political donations with employees
must offer a waiver informing their employees that refusal to contribute to the corpo-
ration's political fund would not adversely affect their employment).
26 WFEIA achieves its ends by permitting penalties for violations of the Act,
including injunctions, compensatory and punitive damages, civil fines, attorney's fees,
and court costs. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-13.
27 With narrow exceptions, Title VII gives employees the right to be free from
religious discrimination, the right to reasonable religious accommodation, and the
right to be free from a religiously hostile work environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (2000). Some commentators have suggested that Title VII may unconstitution-
ally restrict general speech. See, e.g., Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal
Values Collide in an Era of "Political Correctness": First Amendment Protections as a Check on
Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 789, 793-94 (1995)
(discussing the overlap between free speech and employer action). Under that analy-
sis, Title VII may be unconstitutional as specifically applied to corporate religious
speech.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
29 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-10 (prohibiting employees from being required "to
participate in any communications with the employer or its agents or representatives,
the purpose of which is to communicate the employer's opinion about religious or
political matter"); Millazzo v. Universal Traffic Serv., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1251,
1253-54 (D. Colo. 2003) (finding a Title VII violation for employer's "corporate
prayer").
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couraging its employees who desire medical treatment. 30 Under these
laws, a corporation may not issue a corporate mission statement with
religious overtones and require its employees to believe in it.31 A
religious business may not require employees to attend a scripture
reading.
32
However, WFEIA goes beyond Title VII to restrict all corporate
religious expression 33 and will make it impossible for religious corpo-
rations to operate. Far from only preventing coercion or intimida-
tion, WFEIA frustrates the intracompany communications necessary
for religious corporations. Religious corporations need the right to
communicate the nature of religiously expressive task to an employee,
and the right to demand performance, upon compulsion of employ-
ment sanctions. 34 No religious corporation can come into being or
exist if every employee, from the CEO to the night shift worker, may
veto talking about the corporation's religion.
35
Even if clever corporations get enough employee waivers to skirt
some of the Act's impact, enforcement of WFEIA's pre-speech waiver
requirement will muzzle many common forms of religious corporate
expression. The impracticalities of ubiquitous waivers could drive out
of business faith-based social service providers that spiritually mentor
employees.3 6 WFEIA could even censor religious images from the
workplace if employees must sign a waiver before seeing them every
time. For example, Christian bookstores in New Jersey may not put
scripture posters or a painting of Leonardo da Vinci's The Last Supper
on the cafeteria wall. Nor can an international religious peace corpo-
ration, headquartered in NewJersey, use a dove representing the Holy
30 See Millazzo, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (finding a Title VII violation from
employer pressure to rely on faith healing).
31 See id. at 1254 (finding a Title VII violation for requesting participation in a
religious corporate mission statement).
32 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-10 (prohibiting employees from being required "to
participate in any communications with the employer or its agents or representatives,
the purpose of which is to communicate the employer's opinion about religious or
political matter"); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619-20, 621 (9th
Cir. 1988) (finding that Title VII prohibits a Christian corporation from mandating
employee presence, though not attention, at a Bible study meeting).
33 See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-10 to -12.
34 For discussions of how a religious identity fits with the business of a corpora-
tion, see infra Part II.
35 This goes against traditional understandings of the corporation as a separate
entity, in which an employee may act without necessarily being identified with corpo-
rate action. See infra Part II.
36 For one example of such religious businesses, see Bruni & Uelmen, supra note
5, at 647-56 (explaining the spiritual mentoring given to employees by businesses
involved in the Economy of Communion project).
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Spirit as its business logo for letterhead, emails, and brochures.37 Cor-
porations may no longer donate funds to religious charities, since a
corporate message about religion would inevitably get out to its corpo-
rate accountants. 38 The waiver requirement could also conceivably
block Muslim businesses from issuing calls to voluntary prayer, Jewish
butchers from training new recruits about Kosher laws, and Hindu
corporations from instructing their catering manager not to order
beef. Moreover, WFEIA's strict liability leaves no room for error. As
one commentator asked, "What if... a presenter makes off-hand com-
ments about God during a mandatory meeting about employee bene-
fits?"'3 9 Unless a constitutional defense stops them, WFEIA and
statutes like it have a license to drive religion out of the market
square.
B. The Benefits of an Early Constitutional Defense of Corporate
Religious Speech
Exploring constitutional protections of corporate religious
speech brings much-needed clarity to the law and will result in social
benefits. Because no case addresses these legal questions, and
because corporations have (spectacularly) lost legal challenges in
related areas, ignorance and uncertainty may be chilling corporate
religious expression. Timely legal analysis can inform affected corpo-
rations of their rights and can guide lawmakers away from unconstitu-
tional policy proposals. This in turn will promote religious pluralism
in the marketplace.
No one corporate speech case gives corporate religious speech
hard and clear protection. Instead, constitutional corporate speech
litigation considers a variety of highly specific forms of political
speech. That corporations are eager to weigh in on politics around
election time, and that legislators have a surpassing enthusiasm to halt
them, are testaments to the vitality of American democracy. Yet politi-
cal speech cases are factually circumscribed so as to give little assis-
tance to religious corporations. A quick substitution of the word
"religious" for the word "political" in corporate political speech cases
37 But see Statement of Governor Jon Corzine, supra note 25 (disputing WFEIA's
applicability to e-mail).
38 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-10 (prohibiting employees from being required "to
participate in any communications with the employer or its agents or representatives,
the purpose of which is to communicate the employer's opinion about religious or
political matter").
39 Walt Williams, 'Captive Speech' Legislation Has National Roots, ST. J. (Charleston,
W. Va.), Dec. 6, 2007, http://www.statejournal.com/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid
=32270.
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would gloss over innumerable theoretical, legal, and factual issues
unique to the electoral process. Moreover, the hints gleaned from
tortuously extracting political speech cases' dicta and fleeting theoret-
ical claims have yet to establish any clarity for religious speech rights.
What is more, many litigators do not articulate the critical differences
between individual and corporate rights in framing their com-
plaints. 40 The clear legal analysis needed now must focus on corpo-
rate religious speech, specifically and aside from political or individual
speech.
The legal void for corporate religious speech is accompanied by
staggeringly unfavorable results in recent high-profile constitutional
cases considering corporate claims.4I More than individuals, risk-
averse corporations are particularly likely to be intimidated by the suc-
cess of powerful state and federal regulatory schemes currently con-
trolling campaign finances and religion in employment. 42 While the
judgment of Congress and the courts is that these intrusions on
speech are justified, the normal inability of corporations to counter
them with a Speech Clause challenge may lead corporations to be
despondent about the Speech Clause's chances to vindicate them in
future litigation. A simple inquiry into the question can show that this
fear is unfounded.
Unfortunately, corporate and constitutional law scholars have not
filled this information gap. Corporate legal scholarship is a near-uni-
versally secular enterprise. 43 The relative infrequency of religious cor-
porations litigating claims may account for the scholarly oversight of
their potential litigation problems. Such silence and secularism can
hardly encourage religious corporations' pluralistic participation.
Moreover, new regulations affecting corporate religious speech
have given urgency to the need for legal attention. Regulations' sub-
ject matters are expanding to police more forms of conduct motivated
40 See, e.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, No. C07-5374RBL, 2007 WL 3358121, at *1,
*6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2007) (considering together the rights of "two pharmacists
and one corporate pharmacy").
41 See, e.g., infra Part III.D (discussing some adverse corporate political speech
precedents).
42 Title VII, the federal civil rights statute that broadly prohibits religious discrim-
ination by employers arguably encroaches upon corporate religious identity and
expression. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); id. § 2000e(j); supra note 27 (discuss-
ing the relationship between Title VII and the First Amendment).
43 SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 2 (" [V] irtually all (corporate] scholarship shares a
common feature: it is a secular discourse... notwithstanding that the larger society in
which the corporate institution is situated continues to be a very religious society.").
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by or about religion.44 NewJersey's WFEIA is the first to directly raise
the issue. 45 Lawmakers need to be able to identify improper legisla-
tion and the risk-averse corporate speaker needs to know what its
rights are.
In a larger sense, engaging the theoretical questions of corpora-
tions' religion beneficially challenges the widespread legal stereotype
that corporations must be secular. Because corporations are usually
secular, it is a small step to assume that corporations can only be secu-
lar. Creating law on these presumptions can only have disastrous
results for corporate religious speech. Examination of corporate the-
ory plays an important role in dispelling this myth and showing
exactly how corporations may be religious, with significant social
advantages. 46 The religious minority of corporations should be pro-
tected from overbearing legal stereotypes.
The law must awake from its past slumber on corporate religious
speech, lest the damage to religion in the commercial sphere erode
the nation's commitment to pluralism. Religious pluralism demands
that religious actors be free to engage the market on the same terms
as anyone else. The early and explicit examination of an unexplored
issue critical to marketplace equality can aid all those who might be
unaware of the issues at stake.
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATIONS AND THE RIGHT
TO RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Determining whether the Constitution protects corporate relig-
ious speech depends upon understanding what a corporation is, how
it speaks, and if it can be religious.47 Three major corporate theo-
44 See, e.g., Stormans, 2007 WL 3358121, at *10 (litigating a free exercise claim
against a state mandate of pharmacist action, where a colorable free speech claim
could be found); Bradley C. Johnson, Note, By Its Fruits Shall Ye Know; Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson: More Rotted Fruit from Employment Division v. Smith, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1287, 1316 (2005) ("[T]he Free Speech Clause seems the ideal constitutional provi-
sion to protect against what the Free Exercise Clause does not."); infra notes 206-17
and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment doctrine protecting expressive
conduct).
45 See supra Part I.A.
46 See infra Part II.
47 Some social critics suggest that corporate theory does not matter because poli-
ticians and litigators use various theories indiscriminately in the service of predeter-
mined policy preferences. See, e.g., William W. Bratton,Jr., The New Economic Theory of
the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1491 n.96, 1511-12
(1989) (claiming that policy and economic exigencies drove the development of cor-
porate law, not "out of touch" theory); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Coipo-
rate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 669-70 (1926) (despairing of corporate theory's
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ries-artificial entity, contractarian, and natural entity-provide dif-
ferent conceptions of the corporation and its role in society.
48
Understanding corporations through the lens of one model or
another will determine whether a corporation can or should have the
right to religious expression.
Only a natural entity theory of the corporation supports protect-
ing a corporation's religious speech. If corporations are naturally
occurring groups created by individuals, corporations have the same
expressive rights as other groups.49 In contrast, artificial entity and
contractarian theories fail to justify protecting corporate religious
speech. If the state creates corporations as artificial entities, the cor-
poration can have no identity or rights separate from the state.
50 If
the corporation is not an entity, but merely a set of related contracts,
there is no corporate entity to have a right to religious speech. 51 As a
result, choice of corporate theory will produce different answers to
practical relevance because "[e]ach theory has been used to serve the same [political]
ends, and each has been used to serve opposing ends"); Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corpo-
rate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
317, 319-20 (1991) ("In the First Amendment context, questions of corporate law
doctrine and practice are fairly remote, and normative concerns involving the appro-
priate role of the corporation in society arise."). In response to these arguments,
Professor Morton J. Horwitz has convincingly argued that choice of theory had and
has real bearings on corporate legal rights. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revis-
ited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 175-76 (1985) ("We
have spent too much effort repeating the demonstrations of the indeterminacy of
concepts in a logical vacuum; but not enough time trying to show that in particular
contexts the choice of one theory over another is not random or accidental because
history and usage have limited their deepest meanings and applications.").
48 American theories on the corporation are indebted to European corporate
theory. See, e.g., Arthur W. Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 255-57
(1911) (summarizing competing French and German theories of the corporation in
the nineteenth century); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Maitland and the Corporate Revolu-
tion, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 24, 32 (1951) (identifying corporate law's roots in medieval
canon law and the means of its popularization in American legal thought). Corporate
law scholars have framed theories of the corporation under other terms, such as prop-
erty, managerialist, institutionalist, and social entity theories. See William T. Allen,
Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 261, 264-72
(1992). However, these categories reduce to the three main theories identified here.
A property conception reflects a contractarian view. See id. at 264-65. The institu-
tionalist, managerialist, and social entity views are entity theories. See id. at 265-66.
49 See infra Part II.C.
50 See infra Part II.A.
51 See infra Part II.B.
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whether corporations can or should enjoy First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
52
A. The Artificial Entity Theory of a Corporation
The artificial entity theory holds that the corporation is an artifi-
cial entity created and controlled by the state to serve public pur-
poses. 53 This theory reflects the system existing in early American law,
where incorporation occurred when a legislature granted a corporate
charter to individuals pledged to bring about the state's purposes via a
new artificial corporate person. 54 Incorporation functioned as a spe-
cial concession bestowed upon politically elite groups because nine-
teenth-century contract and partnership law prevented individuals
from creating or enforcing limited liability on their own.
55
Adopting this mindset, the artificial entity theory claims that
because the state creates corporations, the state has a special right and
duty to control corporate purposes and actions. 56 States grant incor-
poration in order for corporations to serve public purposes, and they
bind corporations to the state's ends by placing corresponding limits
52 See infra Part III (explaining how choice of corporate theory impacts constitu-
tional law). These three main models of the corporation are so ingrained in Ameri-
can jurisprudence that notes have critiqued them over the course of three centuries.
See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revi-
val of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 806, 835-44 (1989); Note, Constitutional Rights of
the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1645-51 (1982) [hereinafter Constitutional
Rights]; Note, The Legal Idea of a Corporation, 19 AM. L. REv. 114, 115-16 (1885); Katie
J. Thoennes, Note, Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and Personhood
in the United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 204, 204 illus., 225-29 (2005).
53 Hence, corporations were called the "personaficta, the artificial person." Fran-
cis Helminski, Canon Law and Mystical Body: Religious Corporations in Minnesota, 22
HAMLINE L. REv. 689, 689, 692 (1999).
54 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 181.
55 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 Sup. CT.
ECON. REv. 95, 100 (1995) (stating the proposition that the law hinges limited liability
upon state involvement, but critiquing its truth value from a contractarian perspec-
tive). But see Dewey, supra note 47, at 668 (disputing that a fictional entity conception
and a concession theory should be conflated as one theory). The artificial entity theo-
rist would find a state obligation to regulate for the good of the corporation, even if
the state "allowed" the corporate form through bestowal of the power to contract
individually for limited liability.
56 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 181; Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 122 (1992) ("This could be described as the 'Frankenstein'
theory of corporate speech: The state should be able to build limits into its creatures
to prevent them from destroying its creators.").
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in corporate charters. 57 When today's legislatures allow incorporation
for unspecified or general purposes, the artificial entity theorist
understands that this wide-open permission is a matter of ongoing leg-
islative grace-the corporation remains legally bound to any legisla-
tive directions. 58 Because corporations seen in this light are legal
fictions, there is no role for individuals in their design. Therefore,
corporations have no autonomy or identity apart from the state that
created them. As a result, artificial entity theory places the duty of
ensuring corporate social responsibility on the state in its ongoing
supervision.
Because the state may control corporations, the artificial entity
theorist would not understand an ability of corporations to assert
rights against the state. Rights that could limit the state's power to
regulate corporations would inhibit the state from directing the
actions of corporations to the best interests of society. 59 Moreover,
because a corporation is an artificial entity, it is not endowed with, nor
may it possess, the rights of natural persons. Any rights the corpora-
tion has rely upon the same foundation as its charter does: the will of
the legislature and its power to legislate for the common good.
60
Artificial entity theory indicates that because corporations lack
rights or independent identities, they cannot assert rights to religious
speech against an unwilling state.6 1  If the creator is master of the
creature, then the state may dictate the corporation's permissible
speech and religious actions (if any).62 The permissible purposes
specified in the corporate charter might be read to implicitly exclude
57 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 186-87. Limited liability was negated when the
corporation acted ultra vires, or "beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a
corporate charter or by law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed. 2004).
58 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 186-87.
59 See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational "Real
Entity" Theory, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 575, 584-85 (1989); Horwitz, supra note 47, at 184.
60 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 210-11.
61 Cf First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (believing that individual rights are not fungible with corporate rights
because the state must be able to control the greater "threat to the functioning of a
free society" posed by corporate expression); Constitutional Rights, supra note 52, at
1651 ("The notion that soulless, inarticulate corporations could even hold a political
view, let alone insist on the right to express it, would be incomprehensible to the
scholastic philosophers and classical economists who provided the conceptual ground
for earlier explanations of corporate personality.").
62 But see Clarke et al., supra note 3, at 153 (arguing that states should not require
corporations to limit their purposes to profit maximization but instead should accom-
modate investors' "baskets" of wants-investors' varied and broad corporate
purposes).
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religion or independent speech.6 " A state might support prohibitions
on religious corporations if it felt that profit-making in the market-
place required shared rules and or if it felt that religious practices
would hinder the marketplace's efficient functioning.
Regardless of what any particular legislature says on the matter,
artificial entity theory has defined every corporation to be incapable
of having a religious identity. If religious identity requires a con-
science and free will, an artificial creature controlled by the state can-
not be religious. 64 An unreal creature only empowered to fulfill
other, specified purposes lacks the spontaneous power to convert to a
given religion. Moreover, corporate free will does not exist if a corpo-
ration is the empty receptacle of state regulatory decisions. 65 As Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued, "Extension of the individual freedom of
conscience decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of
those cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial
entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is
to confuse metaphor with reality. '66
This view leaves corporations no direct shield against state regula-
tion of their religious expression. By understanding corporations to
be created exclusively by the state for its ends, corporations cannot
hold rights against the state or possess a religious identity. Above all,
artificial entity theory denies that individuals may join together to cre-
ate a religious corporation.
B. The Contractarian Theory of a Corporation
Artificial entity theory's support for heavy-handed state corporate
regulation disregarded the role of individuals in creating and running
corporations. Over time, the fiction that the state created corpora-
tions gave rise to a popular backlash. Many citizens resented the ine-
63 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 8502(b) (2001) ("Notice of an intention to apply
for a charter or articles of association shall ... set[] forth briefly the character and
purpose of the corporation and the kind of service to be performed by it."). But cf
MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 104 (1986) (arguing that the
public has the right to hear all communications).
64 See Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784, 789-90 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); see also infra Part II.C.
65 That is why many corporate political speech cases discount the value of corpo-
rate political expression. Cf Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660 (1990) (permitting regulation of expressive political contributions because
of the "unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries" (emphasis added)); infra Part III.D.
66 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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quality of reserving incorporation as a privilege for the few, and
corporations wanted the rights citizens had against excessive or injuri-
ous state regulations.
67
As a result, democratic movements secured laws guaranteeing the
right of free incorporation. 68 Instead of needing a special legislative
grant to start a corporation, individuals could incorporate by filing a
record of the incorporation with a state office.69 Individuals exploited
this technique during the boom in corporations caused by the Indus-
trial Revolution.
Over time, scholars also recognized that the old idea of the cor-
poration as the state's special creature was outdated.70 They saw the
need for a model that limited state control, empowered individual
incorporation, and defended corporate rights. 71 Therefore the acad-
emy turned to a contractarian model that denies that the corporation
is a separate entity-a model that ultimately limits the rights of indi-
vidual, instead of protecting them.
1. Contractarian Considerations of the Corporation
The appeal of a contractarian model lies in its assertion that
because individuals create and control corporations exclusively
through contracts, the state has no special ability to regulate
corporations. 72 Hence, corporations have rights against the state.
73
Contractarians achieved this "rights" coup by denying that the corpo-
ration is an entity separate from individuals and contracts. The logic
is simple: if there is no corporate entity, there is no corporation to
regulate.7
4
When contractarians deny that corporate entities exist, they
deconstruct the term "corporation" to its component members. "Cor-
poration," for the contractarian, is just a convenient label for a series
67 See Honvitz, supra note 47, at 181, 204.
68 See id. at 181. For a history of the movement from special to general incorpora-
tion, see Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 138-42, 152-54 (1985).
69 See, e.g., JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS 149 (6th ed. 2007).
70 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 181, 183.
71 See id. at 183 ("By rendering the corporate form normal and regular, late nine-
teenth century corporate theory shifted the presumption of corporate regulation
against the state.").
72 See Ribstein, supra note 55, at 101 ("[S]ince the government cannot wholly
prevent firms from contracting for limited liability, it is not in a position to grant a
'privilege' of limited liability by accepting a corporate filing.").
73 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 178, 185.
74 See Ribstein, supra note 55, at 107.
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of specific individual contracts between autonomous individuals, rub-
ber-stamped for enforcement by the state.75 Corporations are neither
inevitable nor natural groups, but temporary choices of individuals
who could pursue other contractual means to achieve economic
efficiency.
76
Because individual corporate members should not lose their
other natural rights if they exercise their natural right to contract,
contractarians believe that individual members ought to be able to
assert these personal rights in the corporate name, including their
right to free speech.7 7 Strict adherence to contract means that
neither the state nor other individuals in the corporate contract can
strip individuals of their rights without their consent. 78 Contractari-
ans therefore believe they prevent the state from singling out corpora-
tions' speech for regulation.
79
75 SeeHorwitz, supra note 47, at 181; Ribstein, supra note 55, at 100-01 ("In other
words, rather than 'creating' limited liability by accepting filings, the state merely
decides whether to enforce a particular contract-in this case, informal limited liabil-
ity."); supra note 55. Contractarians point out that corporate actors are governed for
the good of the corporation by market forces and the other parties to the contract,
removing the need for state regulation. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 55, at 103-04.
Denying the managers' rights to speak denies stockholder speech rights by blocking
stockholders from "contractually [empowering] managers to speak" for them. See id.
at 135; see alsoAustin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] shareholder knows that management may take any action
that is ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a specified supermajority) of
the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a profit. That is
the deal.").
76 See Watts, supra note 47, at 373.
77 Contractarianism became the mainstream of Supreme Court opinion in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) underJustice Stephen
Field and attorney John Norton Pomeroy. See id. at 396; Horwitz, supra note 47, at
177. The case was pivotal, recognizing (without benefit of counsel's argument) that
corporations are persons for the purpose of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment-but only because individuals in corporations are persons. See Santa
Clara, 118 U.S. at 396; Horwitz, supra note 47, at 177-79.
78 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 178, 185 (citing County of San Mateo v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 13 F. 722, 743-44 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)) (stating that the original grant of
Fourteenth Amendment protections stemmed from a contractarian-like position that
found it unfair to make the price of incorporation individuals' equal protection
rights). But see RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 17 (1993) (attempting
to synthesize artificial entity theory and contractarian theory in support of a doctrine
that state requirements of the surrender of corporate constitutional rights are uncon-
stitutional conditions preceding incorporation).
79 SeeWatts, supra note 47, at 124 ("[G]overnment should be required to provide
as much justification for compromising the constitutional rights of corporations as it
must for compromising the rights of individuals.").
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But apart from these individuals and their right to free speech,
there is no corporate entity to have or assert a corporate right, and
that means there is no corporate entity to bear collective responsibil-
ity. Denying that society has groups like corporations existing
between individual and the states necessarily leaves liabilities and
rights only for the individual or the state. 80 This result is desired by
some contractarians because it places the responsibility for corporate
activities squarely on each individual.
8 '
2. Contractarianism, Corporate Rights, and Religious Identity
While contractarianism allows protection for some corporate
speech, contractarianism will not support a right to religious corporate
speech. When there is no corporate group entity, there is no corporate
right to speech and no religious identity apart from the personal
rights of individual members.8 2 These individuals may spread contrac-
tually agreed-upon ideas through constitutionally protected means of
individual expression. But unlike all other corporate speech, expres-
sion of a corporate religious identity is uniquely impossible to spread by
80 Larry Ribstein elaborates:
No, a corporation is not a person. It's a piece of paper sitting in a secre-
tary of state's office. Pieces of paper can't be discriminated against, vote, or
have political ideas.
But corporations are people-the owners and others the corporation
represents in litigation. These people have speech rights, rights not to be
discriminated against, and so forth....
So the African-American owners of this SBA-certified minority-owned
contractor shouldn't lose their civil rights because they chose to do business
in the corporate form. They might be required to sue as a corporation, as in
this case, because that's a convenient way to handle litigation, but that
doesn't determine their individual rights.
Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2004/05/is_a_corporatio.html
(May 22, 2004, 08:56) (commenting on Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that a corporation may sue
for racial discrimination). For an associational theorist's response to this post, see
Posting of Rob Vischer to Mirror of Justice, http://ww.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
mirrorofjustice/2004/07/corporations-as.html (July 29, 2004, 14:50) [hereinafter
Vischer, Mirror].
81 See William Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large Corpora-
tions: Time to Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5 Lo'. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 125-28 (2004).
Because scholars like Quigley doubt that the corporate person may ever be moral,
policies encouraging corporate social responsibility become even more important.
See infra Part II.C.2.
82 See Watts, supra note 47, at 375.
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contract.83 We can see this result by examining individually how con-
tractarianism is a poor form of collective identity and how contractari-
anism legally prevents religious identity.
First, contract law is a poor vehicle to enforce collective identity.
In a general sense, envisioning contract as the basis for action creates
an impression that corporations only exist to further profit-seeking,
and that they have no role in fostering communal relationships or
religious identity.8 4 Like artificial entity theory, contractarian theory
limits corporate activity to chartered purposes and narrowly construes
them. While individuals could theoretically contract to achieve ends
unrelated to profit-seeking, reducing their interaction to contract law
implies that corporations are only designed for commercial purposes.
Contract law generally does not focus on enforcing nonbusiness ends.
Therefore, the corporation, as a series of contracts, is not a vehicle for
communal identity or expression.
Considering a corporation as an entity separate from individuals
explains how a corporation can be contractually made to adopt relig-
ious views as its own. Employees acting in conformity with the corpo-
ration's religion act for the corporation, not for themselves. For the
corporation to have an identity does not require that its employees
actually believe the corporation's creed.
For example, this entity theory would allow a Catholic church to
lease property to a development corporation on the condition that
the land be used in conformity with its moral beliefs (for example, a
covenant not to develop the land for contraceptive sales) or that any
further businesses located on the site become Catholic.8 5 Either con-
83 Since the theory's founding principles ultimately mean that corporations can-
not have a religious identity, contractarian corporate lawyers unsurprisingly do not
have the merits of corporate religion or constitutional protection of corporate relig-
ious expression on their radar. See supra notes 9, 43 and accompanying text (com-
menting on the secular nature of corporate scholarship).
84 Cf Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporate directors are limited to profit-seeking
purposes); Scott Fitzgibbon, "True Human Community": Catholic Social Thought, Aris-
totelean Ethics, and the Moral Order of the Business Community, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1243,
1252 (2001) (arguing that the utilitarian anthropological underpinnings of the con-
tractarian model lead to nonreligious and nonmoral business ethics). Contra Clarke
et al., supra note 3, at 154-60 ("The conclusion that a corporation does not exist
solely for the purpose of wealth maximization follows even if the corporation is under-
stood not as a separate legal person but as a web of contractual relationships.").
Despite Professors Clarke, Frohnen, and Lyons' attempt to show that contractarian-
ism could lead to other results, they seem to agree that a contractarian model does not
satisfactorily account for the moral and social components of the corporation.
85 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 75
(2004) (stating the Church's position).
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tract appears to bind a business to some kind of a religious identity.
When a business is thought to be a separate entity from its members,
the business may act in conformity with Catholic morality, without
needing contracts requiring its employees to be Catholic, or it may
adopt the identity as its own. Either way, its employees need only
structure their acts on behalf of the corporation in conformity with
the belief; employees maintain their own private moral beliefs. 86
However, a contractarian forbids this very notion of a separate entity.
But assuming, as contractarians do, that the corporation is not a
separate entity creates practical, consent-based obstacles to a corpo-
rate religious identity. In that case, the corporate identity is merely
the identity of its contracting members-nothing more and nothing
less. Individuals act in no corporate capacity or aspect other than in
their personal capacity. Each individual must consent to each con-
tractual term. Moreover, the nature of contracts limits how they may
be used to bind anyone to action. For a contractarian, a religious cor-
poration must be understood as the simultaneous, consented, per-
sonal religious identity of each member.
Second, no contract may compel an individual's religious beliefs,
and so no contract between corporate members or with outside par-
ties can bind the corporate members to a personal religious identity.
8 7
Individuals may contract to act on certain terms, terms that were cho-
sen by a contractee motivated by religion. But individuals may not
contract to bind themselves personally to adopt a religion as their own
beliefs. Individuals may bargain away their right to use land to sell
contraceptives, but no court can or should force an individual devel-
oper to be Catholic. If the individual may not be forced to adopt a
creed, then the corporation, which is nothing more or less than indi-
viduals, cannot as a group be bound to believe in a religious creed.
However, a contractarian conception suggests that the corpora-
tion may equivocate as to its moral stances or acts-agreeing to act
according to a precept (no contraceptive sales on this land), moti-
vated by the other contracting party's religion (the Catholic seller).
There is no necessary legal identity as Catholic, because many nonreli-
gious reasons could induce a company to consent to such a contract.
It is therefore possible to assert similarities between contracting mem-
86 Insofar as artificial entity theory and natural entity theory adopt an entity-based
view of the corporation, this analysis reflects those positions. See supra Part ILA; infra
Part II.C. As discussed above, artificial entity theory will frustrate the existence of
religious corporations on other grounds. See infra Part II.A.
87 Whether or not a nation respects religious freedom or the rights of conscien-
tious objectors, individuals' consciences and beliefs are beyond the coercive power of
the state. See infra note 153 (describing how conscience is a personal judgment).
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bers on other, nonreligious, nonconscience-based, nonpersonal mat-
ters-an equivocal corporate identity.
But a corporate religious identity is excluded by contractarian
theory. Equivocations justifying the suggestion of a corporate moral-
ity cannot blur the legal entity/individual line for the personal relig-
ious beliefs forming a corporate religious identity. There is no
equivocal sense in which the law is allowed to bind an individual con-
science personally and individually to represent a belief with which he
disagrees.88 One simply cannot contract one's individual religious
identity away, even if one can contract to speak on other topics. And
contractarians think that attributing religious opinions or identities to
corporations as an entity or group is impossible anyway, because
attributing anything to something that does not exist is a fraud.8 9
As a result, neither contractarian nor artificial entity theory can
fully allow religious individuals the use of the corporate form without
sacrificing their group and religious identities. 90 Neither theory will
provide for corporate rights to religious speech. In fact, the use of
these theories in a world operating on the assumptions of a natural
entity theory will limit individual rights even more.
3. Practical Problems for Contractarianism and Corporate
Religious Rights
Contractarians' hope for the protection of individual rights in the
corporate context is illusory as a practical matter. 91 Contractarians
88 Cf First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (making an analogous argument about political identity).
89 See Ribstein, supra note 56, at 125 ("The corporation, as a nexus of contracts,
cannot be 'speaking."'). In reality, the very idea of a number of people who have an
identical religious view-and come together to express it through contract-does
imply they are an association or group, some entity with an identity. For a theory that
is aware of this, see infra Part II.C.
90 See Gerald L. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large Multinational Corpo-
ration, 46J. CATH. LECAL STUD. 107, 131-33 (2007) (finding contractarianism inade-
quate to account for social responsibility). The inability of contractarianism to allow
religious or nonbusiness moral considerations is played out in the near-total scholarly
alienation between contractarian theory and theories of corporate social responsibil-
ity. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 859-60 (1997)
(book review) ("Contractarians and noncontractarians no longer have much of inter-
est to say to one another; indeed, they barely speak the same language.").
91 Most people recognize that cooperating individuals create a group, which is an
entity or whole of some kind greater than a mere aggregation of individuals. For an
example of this in an introductory corporate law text, see BAUMAN ET AL., supra note
69, at 19-20 (stating that the first key corporate characteristic is being a separate
entity).
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are wrong to think that individual rights are protected by denying that
the corporation is a separate entity.92 Instead, the influence of con-
tractarian theory will mean that asserting a personal religious right in
the course of corporate business costs individuals their limited liabil-
ity.93 This is because the law and the legal world view corporations
from an entity perspective that clashes with contractarian's claims.
Because the entity theorist thinks the corporation has its own
rights and existence, the entity theorist will not let a contractarian
assert individual rights through the corporation. 94 Contractarians
argue that because the corporation is a label for a nexus of con-
tracting individuals, it should be acceptable for members to exercise
their personal rights in the corporate setting. 95 However, because an
entity theorist will distinguish between individual rights and the cor-
porate entity's rights, the entity theorist will understand the individu-
als asserting their own rights in the corporate setting to be something
apart from the corporation-with serious legal consequences.
Whenever a corporation asserts individual rights in its name, lim-
ited liability probably will not attach to these claims. If limited liability
remains exclusive to a separate corporate entity, limited liability will
not protect what the entity theorist sees as noncorporate individual
religious beliefs. 96 The entity theorist will not give corporate entity
attributes (like the corporate name, or limited liability) to what the
entity theorist does not see as belonging to the corporation (individ-
ual claims).97 For the entity theorist, reducing corporations from an
entity to individuals places the corporate form on the same footing as
92 See Watts, supra note 47, at 365. This is why inquiries about the expressive
nature of corporations for some contractarians may turn on whether corporations are
representational.
93 See generally Dwight A. Jones, A Corporation as "A Distinct Entity, "2 COUNSELLOR
78, 81 (1892) ("Any mingling of corporate existence with the existence of the share-
holders will weaken corporate rights.").
94 See State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 850-51
(Minn. 1985) (piercing the corporate veil when the rights asserted were individual in
nature by admission of the individuals). These facts are simplified to one plausible,
but not necessary, interpretation of this complicated case.
95 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 204.
96 See Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784, 789-90 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (stating in dicta that "purely personal" free exercise rights cannot attach
to a corporation but can only belong to the individual principals in a corporation).
97 See McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 850-51.
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partnerships or other individual contracts, where liability is not
limited.
98
As a result, contractarianism will encounter legal obstacles for a
corporation asserting rights based on individual religious beliefs.
Unless the corporation may claim a separate religious identity from
the individuals, the religious right at stake must be the individuals'
and not that of the entity entitled to limited liability. 99 If it is a per-
sonal right, the entity theorist will reason, the individuals should be
personally responsible for their personal actions and claims.100
If understanding corporations to be a nexus of contracting indi-
viduals practically results in risking the loss of limited liability for relig-
ious corporations, a corporate right to religious identity or expression
needs a stronger theoretical ground. Despite some contractarians
who argue that the state should let individuals contract for limited
liability, 10 1 limited liability in current practice is not treated as an
intrinsic right but instead is seen as a legal bonus from the state to a
corporate entity. 10 2
The contractarian conception, like the artificial entity theory
before it, fails to keep pace with emerging corporate realities.1
0 3
Treating corporate decisionmaking like a contract or partnership,
where each member must consent to each action, potentially made
corporate decisionmaking a matter of daily unanimity among stock-
holders. 10 4 In reality, transitory investors empower corporate direc-
tors to make daily decisions. 105 Contracts' absolute identification
between shareholder and corporation meant that agency had a great
potential to violate stockholder rights. Seeing the corporation as a
separate entity from the shareholder could allow a stockholder to let
the corporation act absent his express revision of his contractual
rights-but that is precisely what the contractarian, by definition, ref-
uses to allow.
98 See Blanding, 373 N.W.2d at 789 (grappling with the common understanding
that limited liability is only available for the actions of stockholders investing in a
separate corporate entity, not for personal actions).
99 See id. at 789 n.1 ("[T]he nature of the free exercise clause indicates that it is a
purely personal guarantee.").
100 See McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 851. This decision came through a refusal to over-
turn a state examiner's decision to pierce the veil. See id. at 850.
101 See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 55, at 98.
102 See generally E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Indus-
ty: Massachusetts, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1351, 1373 (1948) (describing the historical shift to
limited liability for corporations).
103 See supra Part II.A.
104 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 202, 209, 213.
105 See id. at 204.
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This theoretical impasse makes desirable a middle position
between two unsatisfactory and diametrically opposite views: one of
the corporation as an artificial entity not emerging from individual
members, and another where a corporation is not an entity but only
members. This middle ground envisions the corporation as a natural
entity emerging from individual members-a difference that permits
corporate religious expressive rights.
C. The Natural Entity Theory and Associational Theory of a Corporation
Denying the existence of a corporate entity is as much a fiction as
saying the state created the corporation to the near-total exclusion of
individuals. When people associate, by nature they become a group;
that group has an identity as a group over and beyond being an aggre-
gation of individuals.10 6 Purposeful human interaction naturally cre-
ates groups: the voluntary association created for commercial action is
called the corporation.1
0 7
Natural entity theory understands this when it identifies the cor-
poration as an entity distinct from its members, 0 8 but naturally
formed by them, and when it argues that the corporation should be
treated as a person. 10 9 Artificial entity theory was right that a corpora-
tion's creator controls and determines it. Artificial entity theory
erred in identifying the state as creator. Contractarian theory was cor-
rect to see that individual agreement and cooperation is at the heart
of the corporation. Its error was to stress the individual aspects at the
expense of the collective.
In addition, natural entity theory is the only conception of a cor-
poration to support corporate religious identity and expression." 0 It
is the only theory recognizing that a corporation is not a "thing," fic-
106 See Machen, supra note 48, at 260.
107 See MICHAEL NOVAK, The Vision of Democratic Capitalism, in THREE IN ONE,
1976-2000 at 47, 47 (Edward W. Younkins ed., 2001) ("[T]he distinctive social inven-
tion of democratic capitalism was not the individual but the voluntary association, regis-
tered in law as the corporation."). See generally FRIEDERICH AUGUST HAYEK, THE MIRAGE
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 148-51 (1976) (discussing the fact that "it is one of the greatest
weaknesses of our time that we lack the patience and faith to build up voluntary orga-
nizations for purposes we value highly").
108 See Machen, supra note 48, at 258-62 ("We need not waste words in discussing
the nature of the existence of this corporate entity. Its existence is precisely as real as
the existence of any other composite unit. . .. 'A corporation is as visible a body as an
army; for though the commission or authority be not seen by every one, yet the body,
united by that authority, is seen by all but the blind.'" (quoting 1 STEWART KYD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 16 (London, J. Butterworth 1793))).
109 See id. at 263-64
110 See infra Part II.C.3-4.
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tional or real, but is a group of people. The theory has several contri-
butions to the subject of corporate religious identity.
1. The Contributions of Natural Entity Theory
The natural entity theory of the corporation gained traction
around the dawn of the twentieth century as a conceptual method of
resolving the overly collectivist and individualist tendencies of the arti-
ficial entity and contractarian theories. I1l It sought to find a more
accurate description of the corporate form than considering it either
a state's artificial creation or a nexus of contracts. As a result, natural
entity theory best fits modern corporate realities.
112
The early twentieth-century school of legal realism saw the Gilded
Age corporate person as far from a fiction. 13 "If a corporation is 'cre-
ated,' it is real, and therefore cannot be a purely fictitious body having
no existence except in the legal imagination. Moreover, a corpora-
tion cannot possibly be imaginary or fictitious and also composed of
natural persons."11 4 Realists criticize artificial entity theory for being
too quick to think that if the corporation is not physically like a corpo-
real person, there is no group life in it:
The invisibility of the corporate entity is no indication that the idea
in respect to it is unreal .... All legal propositions are ideas, but
they are not fictions .... Each new corporation becomes a new
member of society. Its obligations are its own, its property cannot
be appropriated by others. Its separate existence is real and the law
which deals with invisible rights can amply provide for its
supervision.
115
This view saw the corporation as a new group body naturally forming
from the cooperation of its individual members.
Natural entity theory disavows the old corporate privileges and
state control of the past. Instead, in today's free society, "[a]ll that the
law can do is to recognize, or refuse to recognize, the existence of this
111 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 179.
112 Cf Allen, supra note 48, at 276 ("[Uiltimately both our courts and, more
importantly, our legislatures have, in effect, endorsed the entity view."); Horwitz,
supra note 47, at 175-76, 223 ("[A] natural entity theory of the corporation was a
major factor in legitimating big business and.., none of the other theoretical alterna-
tives could provide as much sustenance to newly organized concentrated
enterprise.").
113 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 179-80.
114 See Machen, supra note 48, at 257. This insight is indebted to the German
school of thought on the corporation, especially to Otto von Gierke. See O'rro VON
GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (F.W. Maitland ed. & trans., 1900).
115 Jones, supra note 93, at 80.
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entity."'116 Understanding that individuals, not the state, created the
corporate entity historically "legitimate [d] large scale enterprise" and
"destroy[ed] any special basis for state regulation of the corporation
that derived from its creation by the state."' 17 This theory historically
justified the removal of heavy local regulations that impeded corpo-
rate interstate commerce." 8 Today, it justifies treating corporations
just like any other private entity.
Considering the corporation as an entity solves contractarian
problems that result from considering the group identity equivalent
to individual identity. First, it explains the investor model. Con-
tractarianism denied that the corporation was a separate entity
because a corporation could not seem to exist through time if its
members frequently entered and left through the buying and selling
of shares. It would be unfixed and ever-changing. However, conceiv-
ing of the corporation as an entity separate from individuals in fact
allows for exactly that type of entry and exit: "[a] ny group of men...
whose [investing] membership is changing, is necessarily an entity
separate and distinct from the constituent members.'19 If the corpo-
ration is more than individual contracts, those contracts may change
while the group entity remains. Second, by the same logic, natural
entity theory allows action absent full investor management. The cor-
poration is separate from each individual's contractual agreement.
Members may come to disagree about corporate purposes or the
means to agreed-upon corporate ends even while the entity, identity,
and limited liability of the corporation remain without complete una-
nimity.' 20 Third, natural entity theory overcomes the problem inher-
116 Machen, supra note 48, at 260. Recognizing the individualistic nature of incor-
poration in the modem form, Michael Novak commented:
Here corporations ceased being based on state privilege, monopoly, trust, or
grant and became inventions of civil society and independent citizens. The
state retained a right to approve of applications and to register them, for good
legal order, but it did not create a right or convey its own power to the
corporation or guarantee the latter's survival.... It brought.., unparal-
leled social flexibility and a zest for risk and dare.
MICHAEL NOVAK, THE FIRE OF INVENTION 35 (1999).
117 Horwitz, supra note 47, at 221. But see Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (permitting regulation of political speech because of
the "unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries" (emphasis added)).
118 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 223.
119 Machen, supra note 48, at 259.
120 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 223. Such an idea of a natural entity may be
gravely misunderstood, as seen in one corporate speech case decided by the Unites
States Supreme Court. Instead of understanding that natural entity theory leads to
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ent in other theories, where forming a group inevitably limits
individuals' rights. Even though contractarians insist that individuals
should not lose natural rights by incorporating, including the right to
act expressively and the right to join groups, they in fact surrender a
good portion of these rights. 21 Entity theorists allow for a group
identity distinct from individual identities, so that the entity may
express religious opinions without binding individual members to the
opinions. Fourth, considering the corporation a separate entity
avoids the problems for religious expression involved when con-
tractarians absolutely identified the corporation with the sum of its
members, like employees. Natural entity theory lets the group have
an identity above and beyond the identity of its employees. There-
fore, a corporation may be religious while its employees are not.
The natural entity doctrine gradually became the basis of modern
constitutional law affecting corporations. It was identified as a distinct
theory at the Supreme Court level as early as Justice Story's opinion in
Wood v. Dummer.122 At the dawn of the twentieth century, in Hale v.
Henkel,123 a Supreme Court opinion acknowledged the new nature of
modern corporations and began to look to a natural entity theory.
124
This sea change was a sign of the intervening maelstrom of debate
within the legal profession.1 25 Hale struggled with older and newer
corporate conceptions when it extended Fourth Amendment protec-
tion 126 but denied Fifth Amendment protection 127 to corporations.128
natural speech rights for the corporation, the natural entity theory "conception, as
understood by the Court, suggests that corporations may hold positions with which
their constituents disagree. Therefore, the Court concludes that these entities do not
require First Amendment protection equal to that accorded to individuals." Watts,
supra note 47, at 356-58 (citing Austin, 494 U.S at 658-60). For a discussion of the
split between group identity and individual disagreement in the context of churches,
see Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1391 (1981).
121 See supra Part II.B.
122 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (Story, CircuitJustice, C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944)
(understanding the corporation as analogous to a trust fund, an entity created by
stockholders and not by the state or contracts); see Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Story and
the Modem Corporation-A Closing Circle?, 17 Am.J. LEGAL HisT. 262, 263 (1973); Edwin
S. Hunt, The Trust Fund Theory and Some Substitutes for It, 12 YALE LJ. 63, 63-65 (1902).
123 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (abrogated by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Har-
bor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)).
124 Id. at 76.
125 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 217; Machen, supra note 48, at 253.
126 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75-76.
127 See id. at 67-70.
128 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 182.
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The natural entity conception facilitated many subsequent and
controversial extensions of constitutional protections to corpora-
tions. 129 Although still in force, these corporate protections upset
many scholars who are concerned "that neither states nor sharehold-
ers [can] effectively check management's power over these massive
entities." 130 In any case, debates over the corporate nature eventually
diminished in the face of skepticism about the utility and relevance of
corporate theory. It seemed that theory did not inform corporate law,
but that those in power would use any theory to reach the ends they
wanted.'
2. The Mediating Role of Corporate Associations
If the corporation is a natural social entity, then the corporation
is like other voluntary and cooperative social institutions that provide
important mediating functions in society. 13 2 Between the lone indi-
129 See infra Part III.A.
130 Watts, supra note 47, at 326-28; see also Kent Greenfield, Daniel J.H. Green-
wood & Erik S. Jaffe, Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 SEATrLE U. L.
REV. 875, 884 (2007) (recording the thought of ErikJaffe that critiques of corporate
theory relative to speech rights are motivated by a hostility to corporate speech).
131 See Watts, supra note 47, at 327-28; supra note 47.
132 See Timothy L. Fort, Business as a Mediating Institution, in RETHINKING THE PUR-
POSE OF BUSINESS 237, 242-43 (S.A. Cortright & MichaelJ. Naughton eds., 2002); cf
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835) ("Independent of the perma-
nent associations created by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties,
there is a multitude of others that owe their birth and development only to individual
will."). Scholarly attention came to American associations through Alexis de Toc-
queville's Democracy in America. Inquiring why the French political changes failed
while the early American nation thrived, de Tocqueville noticed voluntary associa-
tions woven into American society that served as a buffer between the individual and
the state to prevent tyranny by either-including "commercial and industrial associa-
tions in which all take part." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 489-95. "It is clear that if
each citizen, as he becomes individually weaker and consequently more incapable in
isolation of preserving his freedom, does not learn the art of uniting with those like
him to defend it, tyranny will necessarily grow with equality." Id. Picking up de Toc-
queville's mantle in recent times, Robert Putnam, Richard John Neuhaus, and Peter
Berger fermented debate by tracing increased social alienation and large-scale politi-
cal collectives ("mega structures") to the decline of smaller groups. See PETER BERGER
& RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE 158 (1977); ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE 48-52 (2000). Legal scholarship responded by championing First
Amendment protection for expressive associations. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The
Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1841, 1864-83 (2001). Why might corporations be overlooked by de Tocqueville's
successors in associational theory? De Tocqueville wrote at the end of an era and at
the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, before society had the opportunity to witness
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vidual and the state sit the many intermediate groups that compose
civil society.1 33 These associations help individuals find a sense of
community, and help the state by voluntarily providing valuable social
services.
Associations do this by their basic relationalfunctions as mediators
in tension with and between individuals and states. 13 4 Associations
provide a place for individuals to have relational meaning both part
of, and short of, an anonymous state union, which by its size, uniform-
ity, and inability to allow individual identification with it, cannot fulfill
the human communal longing. Associations naturally and unavoid-
ably come into being for these ends.13 5 When the corporate associa-
tion mediates, it provides individuals a "bridge" of identity,
expression, purpose, meaning, and social power to check the state.13 6
When states push people out of associations, they limit human
endeavor. Likewise, when individuals seek to replace state corporate
control with radically individual control, not only is the state
excluded, but individuals also find they have no mediating entity with
which they may define their enterprise. Mediating institutions pre-
vent the state from having to fulfill every need because corporations as
separate persons have moral obligations to the community. 13 7 This
conception remedies both the tendency of individualism to discount
corporations as engines for unprecedented economic development. Many associa-
tional theorists since him praise small associations not with tyranny in mind, but
because of their dislike of modernity's size and emphasis on the profit motive. For
one operating on those criteria, corporations may not present as readily sympathetic a
front as, say, the local bowling team. See PuTNAM, supra, at 178. For one torn associa-
tional theorist and critic of modernity, see Henry Adams, The Relation of the State to
Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS Am. ECON. ASS'N 7, 61 (1887), and the discussion of
Henry Adams in Garnett, supra, at 1842-43, 1849-57 and Horwitz, supra note 47, at
192-93. Despite its relatively quieter tone, over a century of associational scholarship
asserts corporations' mediating roles.
133 See RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND 130 (7th ed. 2001) ("The genius of
English polity is a spirit of corporation, based upon the idea of neighborhood: cities,
parishes, townships, guilds, professions, and trades are the corporate bodies which
constitute the state.").
134 See Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 949, 951-52, 958 (2004).
135 See Fitzgibbon, supra note 84, at 1272.
136 See Vischer, supra note 134, at 959-60.
137 See Clarke et al., supra note 3, at 150 (explaining the moral duties attendant
upon corporate personhood); Vischer, supra note 134, at 951-52; id. at 958 ("When
afforded their natural vitality and vibrancy, however, associations are the vehicles by
which we transcend our individual, atomistic existences and carve out a communal
role for ourselves that is distinct from, and often in opposition to, the identity of the
state.").
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communal relation and responsibility in favor of unfettered individual
autonomy, and also the tendency of collectivism to use individuals as
means to collective ends.
1 38
Society works because states and individuals partially limit and
control associations. Associations do not encroach upon state respon-
sibilities because the state may regulate to keep their size or power
restricted-such as with antitrust laws. Associations do not take the
place of individuals because the state reserves rights to both individu-
als and associations, not just to associations alone. Individuals limit
associations by being the members creating and running them. In the
end, associations intrinsically fortify the strength of the nation
because "[t] o be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon
we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of
public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed
towards a love to our country and to mankind.' 13 9 The corporation is
one such group or community among many associational entities
straddling the middle ground between individuals and the state. 140
Fondness, friendship, and accomplishment can result from corporate
involvement.
Picturing a corporation as an institutional association shows how
a corporation may be both created by and composed of quasi-contrac-
tual arrangements between individuals (as in the unduly individualis-
tic contractarian theory) and an entity specially protected by laws (as
in the overly collectivistic artificial entity view).141 Individual and col-
lective tensions exist and should exist in every group. In fact, "when
any single anchor of the association in relationship (individual versus
138 See Vischer, supra note 134, at 957.
139 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 202 (J.C.D. Clark
ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790).
140 Failure to understand this creates confusion in modem Supreme Court juris-
prudence. See infra Part III.D.
141 Corporations perform this mediating function through a variety of sizes and
roles. See Vischer, Mirror, supra note 80 ("Smaller, non-profit corporations are espe-
cially likely to bring folks together in pursuit of a bonding, identity-shaping objec-
tive-i.e., provide a vehicle for participants to define themselves in a way that sets
them apart from the surrounding, impersonal society. Large corporations focused on
the bottom-line are less likely to meet that need .... But to the extent that particular
corporations do serve a mediating function, it is important to acknowledge that func-
tion and protect it where possible, just as it's important to protect the mediating func-
tions of voluntary associations .... My concern with the 'piece of paper' rhetoric is
that it encourages our society's tendency to view legal issues through the one-dimen-
sional lens of individual rights versus collective will. If we want to bring about a soci-
ety with a robust system of bulwarks against alienating and coercive megastructures,
we may need to think seriously before poking holes in corporations' claims to be
something more than the sum of their parts.").
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association versus state) is given unfettered authority to pursue its own
interests at the expense of the others, the resulting disparity eviscer-
ates the association's mediating values."' 42 So, when the artificial
entity theory prioritizes state control, the result is not merely that the
corporation lacks autonomy, but that individuals making up corpora-
tions have their voices deemphasized. When contractarianism accen-
tuates individualism too much, it excludes the state from valid
regulatory functions and it imposes costs on group functionality. In
the end, a contractarian's individualism ultimately harms individuals
when it limits the value of their voluntary association.
This social dynamic allows natural entity theorists to respond to
the charge that natural entity theory strengthens corporations too
much. Beccause a natural entity theory allows managerial autonomy
to be delegated by individual stockholders, these managers could
harm individuals. As a result, some artificial entity theorists wish to
reduce the freedom of corporations. However, most of these critics of
natural entity theory do not criticize extreme cases of unbounded cor-
porate control; rather, they criticize corporate independence as such
and dispute the value of mediating groups in society. If the individu-
als who contract and form the corporate entity bind corporate manag-
ers through articles of incorporation, shareholders need not wait for
state regulation to check corporate managers. 143 They can check
managers on their own, or they may sell their shares. If they fail, the
state may correct abuses through criminal and commercial laws. In
this way there is no void of individual checks that necessitates over-
powering state regulation to destroy the autonomy of the corporate
group's appointed managerial leader. Recognizing the tension in
which corporations exist shows that fears of completely untrammeled
managers ignore the real individual checks on them. 144
Perhaps the popularity of other theories stems from the real con-
cern that natural entity theory wrongly enables corporate officers to
142 Vischer, supra note 134, at 952.
143 See Ribstein, supra note 55, at 104.
144 These statements, of course, raise important theoretical questions about the
normative structure and role of the corporation in society, unfortunately beyond the
scope of this Note. Guided by a principle of subsidiary, modern corporate legal schol-
arship in Catholic social thought is currently engaged in a vigorous debate over ques-
tions of "size, structure, and purpose" of corporations in economic and social life. See
Russello, supra note 90, at 128-34. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social
Thought and the Corporation, I J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 595 (2004) (summarizing the
debate); Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought,
I J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 561 (2004) (same).
2oo8] 1743
1744 NUIRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 03:4
act in a socially irresponsible manner. 145 But individuals who create
the corporations live together and are affected by other corpora-
tions. 146 That is why social responsibility matters for consumers and
corporations. 147 Religious identity can help corporations by providing
some of the benefits traditionally associated with less-regulated medi-
ating associations.
3. Natural Entity Theory, Corporate Rights, and Religious Identity
Natural entity theory champions corporate expressive rights.
Because it understands that corporations allow individuals to find
social meaning in an entity and identity larger than themselves, it
understands that belonging to a corporation forms part of individuals'
social identities. Since corporations naturally have a group identity in
formation, existence, and activity, they should be able to express it to
the world.
148
Furthermore, natural entity theory supports corporate religious
identity. Because a corporate religious identity can emerge from and
be maintained by the individuals cooperating in the corporate activity,
these indviduals can choose to maintain a religious identity. This
depends upon individual choice. "For many millions of religious per-
sons the daily milieu in which they work out their salvation is the com-
munal, corporate world of the workplace.... [It is] a kind of second
family. '149 As a result, religious individuals may be attracted to work
for a religious corporation, or to found one. More broadly, religion
will have a subtle, but undeniable, influence. Managers and other
actors will (and should) act in conformity with religious principles of
moral responsibility. If they understand responsible action to be in
145 SeeRussello, supra note 90, at 131 (arguing that natural entity theory's freedom
for the association enables its lack of social responsibility).
146 This analysis is not affected if another group forms a corporation, as with a
wholly owned corporate subsidiarity. Such corporations should not be treated differ-
ently because although the critical individual control is attenuated, it exists ultimately
through the other corporate entity.
147 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
148 See Vischer, supra note 134, at 960. Even corporate architecture expresses its
identity. See Richard W. Weaver, Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology, 13 GA. REV.
19 (1959) ("[A] tall and imposing-looking building is demonstrating that there is
even a rhetoric of matter or of scene.").
149 MICHAEL NovAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 56 (1990) (intro-
ducing the mediating functions of a corporation from a broad theological
perspective).
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the best interests of the corporation, 150 religion likely informs what
they think responsible action is.
Corporations also may express their religious identity or opin-
ions. First, if individual creators give corporations a religious purpose,
the very fact of corporate existence communicates that the creators
share a religious identity. Second, individuals endow corporations
with the ability to act in furtherance of their purposes, including
through the means of communication. Third, managers in their
broad discretion may speak on any social topic they see related to the
corporate ends. For example, they may express on the corporation's
behalf how a social matter involving religion may affect the business,
subject only to review or affirmative limits made by responsible corpo-
rate representatives of the stockholder or board of directors. This
statement may be a religious opinion, in a loose sense.1 51
The corporate entity resembles a person even to the point of hav-
ing a group conscience. 152 The corporation has its own purposes and
identity, makes choices, and has a faculty for judging the rightness
and wrongness of action (conscience). 53 The corporation is a compos-
ite person, made of many individual wills, opinions, and identities.1 54
Acting in violation of these, or in other words, acting contrary to the
corporate purpose, is how a corporate conscience may be violated. 1
55
150 See Clarke et al., supra note 3, at 166-72 (considering conflicts between the
religious manager's free moral agency and the manager's duty to maximize business
profits).
151 The Court in Bellotti implicitly allowed these types of expression. The Court
rejected the notion that a state had the right to restrict corporations to topics "materi-
ally affecting any of the property, business, or assets of the corporation" as a "novel
and restrictive gloss on the First Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 768, 777 (1978). But see Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634-35
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (proposing a denial of expressive association
rights to commercial entities).
152 See Machen, supra note 48, at 263 ("[W]hen ajurist first said, 'A corporation is
a person,' he was using a metaphor to express the truth that a corporation bears some
analogy or resemblance to a person, and is to be treated in law in certain respects as if
it were a person, or a rational being capable of feeling and volition.").
153 See I THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I, q. 79, art. 13, at 407-08
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947); id. pt. I-Il,
q. 19, arts. 5-6, at 674-76; CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW
236-40 (1999); see also id. (explaining that conscience is morally binding because
conscience is a profound judgment as to whether a particular action treats others with
love or whether the action does good).
154 See Machen, supra note 48, at 258-60.
155 Cf Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 32 (1986) (Rehn-
quist, CJ., dissenting) (discussing explicitly the rights of "natural" persons-not cor-
porations-to speak or not to speak as part of a greater freedom of conscience). If
people incorporate a corporation with a strictly business motive, it may analogously
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If religious opinion depends upon an expression of conscience, then
from its duty to further its own purposes, the corporation has the natu-
ral capacity for, and right to, its own religious expression.
156
Although natural entity theory developed in a society where law
or habit often separated business concerns from other expressive val-
ues, the idea of a corporation does not necessarily limit corporate pur-
poses to business. 157  The value of mediation and association
intrinsically has no subject matter limit. Religion and profit-making
coexist in a rich pluralistic framework of groups mediating between
individuals, the state, and other groups. The corporation is a flexible
entity determined by individual choices through law; its individual cre-
ators have the choice whether a corporation shall be single purpose
(profit-making) or would do better to have many purposes (profit-
making, social responsibility, and religious identity). Absence of cor-
porate religious identity can only come from individual choices to
incorporate for other purpose, state-created limits on permissible cor-
porate purposes, or both.
4. Religious Pluralism and the Natural Entity Theory
For the pluralist, the state should not bar religion from any area
of social activity. America's commitment to full and equal civic partic-
ipation irrespective of creed demands protection for religious identi-
ties in the public square and market square. Conceptualizing
religious expression as a purely individual or private affair ignores the
fact that individuals always act in a relational setting.
Although freedom of conscience lies at the heart of individual
religious expression, this goal cannot be served by protecting only
individual free exercise rights. To protect the individual's freedom of
conscience-in essence, his own sphere of autonomy-from substan-
tial government intrusion, society must protect the social structure or
violate that corporate conscience when it acts beyond its secular purpose. The pur-
pose of this Note is not to force religious or other opinions or identities upon corpo-
rations that choose not to be multipurpose. If they wish to change to be religious,
reincorporation, merger, or dissolution may allow for amendment of the corporate
purpose.
156 Cf Machen, supra note 48, at 263 ("The truth is that the essence of juristic
personality does not lie in the possession of rights but in subjection to liabilities.").
157 The reason an artificial entity theory has this limitation is because of the state
control factor. A state cannot set up a religious group (at least, not in the Western
tradition of the separation of church and state). But with natural entity theory, where
the artificial entity theorist's overbearing quality of state control is removed, that
state/religion divide is not present.
1746 [VOL. 83:4
FROM PUBLIC SQUARE TO MARKET SQUARE
zone in which that freedom of conscience is exercised. 158 It must also
protect the conscience rights of individuals in groups.
Corporate religious speech should be protected because that pro-
tection in turn protects the right to form a religious corporation.
Religion by its nature lends itself to expression on individual and asso-
ciational levels. 159 Because there is nothing about religion that keeps
it from group expression, there is nothing unique about religion that
prevents it from being one corporate purpose among others. If the
law recognizes this, it will allow corporations to adopt a religious iden-
tity. Exploration of this question returns to the new legal scholarship
arguing as a matter of policy that religion may benefit corporations.
160
In fact, corporate secularism might contribute to worker aliena-
tion in corporate cultures. Profit-making (the distinctive trait of the
corporate association) can be part of individuals' broader quests to
develop their individual values, or its secularity can be an obstacle to
their total self-integration. Keeping religion and other communal
identities out of profit-making corporations can result in atomistic
individuals with little job or proprietary identity. Individuals in
today's corporate associations may need a shared identity and a sense
of communal place, more than those in any other social group. This
sense of belonging, religious or not, is best conceptualized by the
framework of a natural entity model.
For all these reasons, the natural entity model is integral to
defending a corporation's First Amendment rights to religious
speech. Only this model may properly explain the relationship
between corporations, individuals, and society. By contrast, time has
revealed artificial entity and contractarian theories to be unrealistic
models of the modern corporate form. 16 1 They do not adequately
explain current business practice or support a religiously pluralistic
society. These models should not be relied upon in future legal or
constitutional scholarship because they misunderstand how corpora-
tions have developed. The state's proper role does not extend to
pushing individuals and their associations out of society, and the state
should not use outdated legal constructs to deny protection to corpo-
rate religious expression.
158 See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1606, 1748
(1987) [hereinafter Developments].
159 See id. at 1740-42.
160 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
161 See supra Part IA-B.
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This Note will now show how natural entity philosophical prefer-
ences support First and Fourteenth Amendment protection for corpo-
rate religious expression.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATE RIGHTS TO FREE
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
Corporations have the constitutional right to freedom from state
interference with their religious expression. Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence acknowledges that corporations are persons holding
rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. These
rights derive from the longstanding acknowledgement that the corpo-
ration is an independent, communal entity created by individuals.
162
Because corporate persons merit the same protection as individual
persons, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that corporations
receive the same liberties of expression that individuals enjoy, includ-
ing protection for their religious expression.
163
In addition, the First Amendment provides separate and ample
protection for corporate religious expression. 164 As many theories of
the First Amendment make clear, constitutional shelter for the free-
dom of speech does not hinge on the individual or corporate identity
of its speaker.' 65 Although no case or scholarship has explicitly
explored corporate religious expression, cases litigating corporate
rights in other areas support the conclusion that corporations are
entitled to full protection for their religious expression.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Prelude of Personhood
Today, the First Amendment protects corporate speech because
corporations are "persons" for purposes of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Through the doctrine of incorpora-
tion, 67 corporations' Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
unlawful state deprivations of liberty encompasses First Amendment
162 See infra Part III.A.
163 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 & n.15 (1978).
164 See infra Part III.B-D.
165 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777-80 (1978).
166 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167 As a matter of historical fact, the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states
from the operation of the Due Process Clause. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Did the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against States?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 443 (1996) (discussing originalist arguments for and against incorporation).
Overruling incorporation might not affect the impermissible scope of federal action.
However, without incorporation, on state levels, the corporate speech inquiry would
have to look to state protections.
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free speech liberties. 168 The Fourteenth Amendment therefore
requires the same protection for corporate speech-including relig-
ious speech-as is given to individual speech.
Understanding corporations as constitutional "persons" clarifies
that corporate action is not state action. Unlike an artificial entity
theory identifying the corporation as a creature of the state, natural
entity conceptions explain that incorporation of a religious business is
not an establishment of religion. 169 The state's role is only to protect
private religious associational and economic rights on a neutral foot-
ing with nonreligious associations. The state does not create and
mandate corporate purposes, but instead facilitates individual relig-
ious activity by allowing religious actors equal access to incorporation.
Chartering a religious corporation resembles a religious group's self-
formation. Further, because natural entity theory supports under-
standing corporations as persons, it makes sense to permit corpora-
tions to have the inalienable liberty to define their own identity-a
liberty clearly enjoyed by individual persons. 170 So long as the govern-
ment neutrally enforces corporate laws without discriminating for or
against religion, it does not endorse or establish one viewpoint to the
detriment of others.
As such, there is no Establishment Clause problem with the pro-
tection of corporate religious speech. The Establishment Clause bars
state actors from establishing a state religion.1 71 Corporations ordina-
rily cannot be persons and state actors under the same Fourteenth
Amendment.1 72 However, could approving the incorporation of a
168 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779-80; Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244,
249 (1936). Personhood matters to enforce rights against states. For example, while
the Fifth Amendment does not limit its text to protection of the property of persons,
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the rights flowing from it, are textually limited to
persons. See CarlJ. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 591 n.71 (1990).
169 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 3 ("[T]he corporation ... is not an arm of the
state. Consequently, First Amendment concerns about the 'separation of church and
state' do not mandate a 'separation of faith and corporation.' The absence of relig-
ious language in scholarly and business discourse, therefore, reflects a social practice,
not a legal requirement."); see also supra Part II.
170 For a discussion of the individual's liberty interest in his or her own identity
and concept of personhood, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.").
171 See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . ").
172 SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 3 ("[T]he corporation . . . is not an arm of the
state.").
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religious corporation be an impermissible government establishment
or endorsement of religion?1 73 If the state creates corporations and
their purposes, it would violate the Establishment Clause to charter
and control a religious entity.174 Artificial entity theorists, identifying
corporate identity with state policy, might specially prohibit religious
corporations as establishments. Contractarians do not see corpora-
tions as separately existing entities, so they (presumably) would skirt
this problem by claiming there is no state action because there is no
entity chartered to act as the state. But historically, states have incor-
porated churches without Establishment Clause problems. 175 Accord-
ingly, chartering corporations for open-ended purposes poses no
problem.
The historical development of the Fourteenth Amendment also
rests upon natural entity theory. Because corporate charters and con-
tract law covered most early American corporate disputes, for a cen-
tury, corporate constitutional challenges usually were against states
and limited to Contracts Clause suits, one of the few pre-Fourteenth
Amendment provisions limiting states.176  But as the Industrial
Revolution progressed, the simultaneous rise of modern regulation
and the large corporation began generating new corporate constitu-
tional issues at the same time that the Fourteenth Amendment began
limiting state action.
1 77
The Supreme Court recognizes that corporations are persons
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. In its early considera-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases178 very narrowly construed the Privileges and
Immunities Clause1 79 and Equal Protection Clause, 80 which had the
implicit result of reducing the strength of this provision as a potential
corporate shield.18' The Court dramatically reconsidered this inter-
pretation in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,182 under
173 See Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Cor-
porate Law?, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 239, 259-65 (2003).
174 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
175 See Helminski, supra note 53, at 692.
176 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
177 See Mayer, supra note 168, at 606.
178 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
179 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180 Id.; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 100-05; Horwitz, supra note 47,
at 177.
181 See Horwitz, supra note 47, at 177.
182 118 U.S. 395 (1886)
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the contractarian guidance of Justice Stephen Field. 183 The Court
unanimously, summarily, and without oral argument recognized the
corporation as a "person" entitled to equal protection of the laws.
184
While corporations never were to be citizens for the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,1 85 soon after, the Court also confirmed corpora-
tions as persons sheltered by the Due Process Clause.' 8 6 Then, as
courts realized liberties protected by the Due Process Clause included
liberties guaranteed by the Bill or Rights, they "incorporated" the Bill
of Rights against the states 187 to protect those liberties shared by Four-
teenth Amendment persons.
1 88
183 See id. at 396 ("The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question of
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which for-
bids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."); Horwitz,
supra note 47, at 178 (explaining how contractarian Justice Field identified the corpo-
ration as a person when that precedent came to be used extensively by natural entity
theorists).
184 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 397, 417.
185 See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181,
185 (1888).
186 See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898); Gulf, Colo. & Santa F6 Ry.
Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v.
Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391 (1892); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129
U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
187 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978);Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1952); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
188 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776, 780. Corporate Bill of Rights protections are a
work in progress. Fourth Amendment protections for the corporation came early, in
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906), abrogated by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 65-73 (1964), and were later supported in the regulatory field by Mar-
shall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978), but the Court created exceptions for
the particular industries of liquor, see Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 77 (1970), firearms, see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972), and
mining, see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981). The Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy, see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569
(1977), Takings, see Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922), and Due Process
Clauses do apply, see Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 171, 177
(1893). However, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not
apply. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75. The Sixth Amendment protects the corporation's
right to ajury trial in criminal cases, see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S.
56, 76-77 (1908), while the Seventh Amendment protects the right to ajury trial for a
corporation in most civil cases, see Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970). There
are no decisions on the Second, Third, or Eighth Amendments. The Ninth and
Tenth Amendments are inapplicable. Other constitutional rights depending on citi-
zenship and not "personhood" are inapplicable, such as being a citizen under Article
III, see Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 86-87 (1809), even though
corporations are citizens for purposes of diversity citizenship, see id. Corporations are
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The First Amendment is bound by the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect corporations' speech as it protects individuals. Fifty years
after the first recognition of Fourteenth Amendment corporate per-
sonhood, the Court extended the First Amendment through the Press
Clause to a newspaper corporation. 189 Almost thirty years later, the
Speech Clause protected corporate speech' 90 when it relieved the "law
firm of the NAACP" from state regulation. 191 The Court believed that
"modes of expression and association protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments" do not require natural or individual speakers. 192
It gave the NAACP institutional standing to sue for its own speech
rights and representative standing to vindicate its members' rights. 193
not citizens for Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 528-29 (1839). Corporations also lack the constitutional
right to privacy, see Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974) (quoting
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950)), while other rights,
such as the right to travel, have not been decided. See Charles Gray, Comment, Keep-
ing the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1329, 1354 (1986); Michael Schiano, Note,
Eminent Domain Exercised-Stare Decisis or a Warning: City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 4 PACE L. REV. 169, 188-91 (1983). But see Mayer, supra note 168, at 639
(" [T] he invocation by corporations of more intangible rights-of association, privacy,
and speech-in response to Modern Regulation, and in defense of Modern Property,
severely strained the argument that corporations are 'persons.'"); id. app. I, at 664; id.
app. II, at 666.
189 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 243-51; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional
First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1275 (2005) (arguing that the First Amend-
ment might protect the press as an institution because, compared to other institu-
tions, it "check[s] government abuse and provid[es] a forum for democratic
deliberations"). But see Patrick Burke, Comment, Pacific Gas and Electric v. Public
Utilities Commission of California: Negative First Amendment Rights for Corporations, 15
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 377 (1986) ("Newspapers are distinguishable from
other types of corporations because of the specifically enumerated 'freedom of the
press' within the first amendment. Historically, corporations have not played the role
of newspapers as conveyors of individual ideas and opinion.").
190 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963) ("The NAACP was formed in
1909 and incorporated under New York law as a nonprofit membership corporation
in 1911 .... The corporation is licensed to do business in Virginia, and, has 89
branches there.").
191 See id. at 421-22 ("[T]he prospective litigant retains not so much a particular
attorney as the 'firm' of NAACP and Defense Fund lawyers, which has a corporate
reputation for expertness in presenting and arguing the difficult questions of law that
frequently arise in civil rights litigation.").
192 See id. at 428-31.
193 See id. at 415, 430-31. Corporations' dual standing reflects a natural entity
theory of the corporation, where the mediating societal structure achieves an exis-
tence and identity apart from the mere contracts of its members.
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Sympathy for the NAACP did not bias the Court to give it protection
where corporations otherwise lacked rights 94 :
The course of our decisions in the First Amendment area makes
plain that its protections would apply as fully to those who would
arouse our society against the objectives of the petitioner .... For
the Constitution protects expression and association without regard
to the race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members
of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.
1 95
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits First Amendment protec-
tions that discriminate against corporations. This affirmative limita-
tion is in addition to (and perhaps makes redundant) the
simultaneous First Amendment principles dictating the equal protec-
tion of corporate and individual speech.
B. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Corporate Speech
The Fourteenth Amendment claims for equality between corpo-
rations and individuals culminate in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,19 6 where the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's
Speech Clause protects corporate speech just as it protects individuals'
speech. 19 7 In Bellotti, the First and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
tected the First National Bank of Boston's right to opine during a ref-
erendum, 198 and affirmed that when states regulate any kind of
nongovernmental speech, 19 9 the speaker's identity does not matter.
20 0
194 Some artificial entity theorists would regulate corporate speech, but carve out
exceptions for NAACP-type groups less obviously the creature of the state. See, e.g.,
David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541,
545 (1991). Such speaker selectivity discriminates among types of speech preferred
by society and precludes religious profit-seekers from entering the marketplace. It
also implies that corporations gain protection through the expressive association
rights of individuals and not through corporate personhood and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.
195 Button, 371 U.S. at 444-45.
196 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
197 See id. at 777, 780; Ribstein, supra note 55, at 127 ("The Court reasoned that
speech that is otherwise protected does not lose its protection because the speaker is a
corporation-that speech is protected not merely as a property right, but as a part of
the guarantee of liberty to all natural and artificial persons."). Despite subsequent
Supreme Court developments, much of Bellotti remains controlling law. See infra Part
III.D.
198 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
199 Speech in this context does not include specific nongermane exceptions to
protection, such as obscenity, incitement, child pornography, etc. See generally
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 3-194 (2d ed. 2005)
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In so doing, the Court removed any grounds to think corporations'
speakers are unprotected by the First Amendment.201 "The proper
question therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First Amend-
ment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natu-
ral persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the relevant
statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect. '20 2 Bellotti also found that profit motive or organizational
structure was irrelevant to the capacity to inform, and therefore cor-
porate identity was not a bar to gaining protection as speech indepen-
dently valued by the First Amendment.
20 3
Both the First and Fourteenth Amendments independently man-
dated this holding. The Court found corporations' rights equal to
other Fourteenth Amendment persons; hence, they held that the lib-
erty interest of expression must be equally protected for all Four-
teenth Amendment persons.2 0 4  The Court supplemented that
holding by explaining how the First Amendment also by its nature
protects all types of speech necessary to societal free discourse and infor-
mation-regardless of who the speaker is. 20 5 This First Amendment
protection is in addition to any protection the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ensures.
Corporate religious expression can be verbal or conduct-based
expression without losing its Speech Clause protection. Bellotti
requires regulations of speech to pass a strict scrutiny analysis-the
most stringent analysis-which holds a regulation can only be found
(exploring comprehensively the many actions and expression not protected by the
First Amendment).
200 Bellotti adopts a principle of strict neutrality, reflected in doctrine that does not
discriminate by speaker. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777, 780. Distinguishing between
corporate and individual speakers treats "persons" unequally. See Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 21 (1975);
infra Part III.C.3.
201 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 256-59
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a true
interpretation of Bellotti means that corporations have full constitutional speech
rights). Bellotti is "a case that would establish the First Amendment rights of corporate
America." CARYL LYNN SEGAL, COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65
(1989).
202 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776; see Developments, supra note 158, at 1746.
203 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
204 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 353-54 (1995) (explain-
ing that the Court's holding in Bellotti extended speech protection both to corporate
and corporeal persons); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1986) (holding a state effort to compel corporate speech unconstitutional); Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 778.
205 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
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to be constitutional if it "furthers a compelling governmental interest
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."20 6  Likewise,
although not all religious conduct is susceptible of communicative
content, when a corporation's religious conduct has expressive com-
ponents, it still merits some protection. Bellotti's interpretation of the
Speech Clause requires that regulations of expressive conduct pass the
somewhat lower threshold of intermediate scrutiny in order to be con-
stitutional. 207 Intermediate scrutiny requires a constitutional regula-
tion of expressive conduct to be content neutral, serve a substantial
government interest, be narrowly tailored to the interest, and "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion." 20 8 Cognizable expressive conduct qualifying for intermediate
scrutiny both "'inten[ds] to convey a particularized message"' and
"'the likelihood [must be] great that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it."'209 Like language, religious or con-
science-based conduct often involves an element of protest or identity
that is commonly intended to have expressive components.
2 10
206 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007) (opinion of Rob-
erts, C.J. & Alito, J.); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
207 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 295 (1984).
208 Id. at 293. Professor Secunda asks whether the AFL-CIO's model Worker Free-
dom Act is an impermissible time, place, and manner regulation because it is not
content-neutral. See Secunda, supra note 22, at 210 n.8. A state's regulation of the
time, place, or manner of speech, if it avoids discriminating on the content of speech,
merits an intermediate scrutiny analysis for its constitutionality. See City of L.A. v.
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. But the regulatory singling out of
religious speech has been held to be an impermissible discrimination on the basis of
content and viewpoint, and therefore fails to justify a time, place, or manner regula-
tion. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995).
Therefore, WFEIA's singling out of religious opinions most likely is content-discrimi-
natory, will not merit intermediate scrutiny, and instead will merit strict scrutiny. For
a rejection of possible government interests to overcome First Amendment strict scru-
tiny protection, see infra Part III.D.
209 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea.").
210 For some examples of cases where the First Amendment protected actions that
were symbols of protest, see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (flag burning), Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (armband),
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (flag waving).
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These types of Speech Clause claims may protect corporate relig-
ious conduct where the Free Exercise Clause 211 and claims for expres-
sive association rights under the Speech Clause do not.2 12 The
Supreme Court's more restrictive test for a finding of Free Exercise
Clause protection announced in Employment Division v. Smith213 causes
many religious claimants to find unfavorable treatment under current
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. 214 The resulting movement
among civil rights litigants to frame Religion Clause claims as Speech
Clause claims signals a practical judgment that today's Speech Clause
favors individual religious autonomy more than the Free Exercise
Clause does.215 This is true for religiously expressive corporate con-
duct. Arguing that a regulation of corporate religious speech violates
the Speech Clause will likely be more successful than arguing it vio-
lates the Free Exercise Clause.
Even expressive religious conduct is likely to do better under the
Speech Clause. Although the reduced protection given to expressive
conduct suggests that the intermediate scrutiny analysis is closer to the
restrictive Smith test than to strict scrutiny, the differences count. The
advantage of intermediate scrutiny is its particular requirements of
narrow tailoring, content neutrality, and alternative channels: they
form more and different kinds of obstacles over which a regulation
211 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .. prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].").
212 See id. ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
.. "); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-57 (2000) (delineating the extent
of expressive association rights).
213 494 U.S. 872, 881-86 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws
burdening religiously motivated conduct no longer must be justified by a compelling
interest, absent the concomitant "hybrid" violation of another constitutional right).
214 There are several recent examples. See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. v. Baker, No.
04-cv-02512-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1489801, at *6-12 (D. Colo. May 18, 2007) (holding
that notwithstanding the Free Exercise Clause, a "pervasively sectarian" university may
be denied equal funding benefits); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 85 P.3d 67, 92-95 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause was not
violated when a Catholic charity was required to provide insurance coverage for pre-
scription contraceptives). See generally Julie Manning Magid &Jamie Darin Prenkert,
The Religious and Associational Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
191, 210-216 (2005) (speculating on a post-Smith hybrid rights claim of free exercise
and expressive association for businesses).
215 See, e.g., Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 620 n.1 (2d Cir.
2005) (noting that a Free Exercise Clause claim was dropped for a stronger Speech
Clause claim over the same religious expression);Johnson, supra note 44, at 1300-08
(providing a case study suggesting the empirical weaknesses of free exercise protec-
tion); supra Part L.A (discussing some corporate religious free exercise claims poten-
tially involving an overlooked speech act.).
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may stumble. Narrow tailoring requires that a regulation exempt the
expressive conduct unless the exemption would materially interfere
with the government interest.216 A regulation of conduct may not
achieve its purpose by targeting the communicative impact of the con-
duct. If it does so, the regulation discriminates on the basis of content
and fails to satisfy intermediate scrutiny's requirement of content neu-
trality. Then, instead of intermediate scrutiny, the more speech-pro-
tective analysis of strict scrutiny will test the regulation's
constitutionality.
21 7
Corporate religious speech deserves these analyses-analyses that
individuals' speech about, or motivated by, religion usually finds
under the First Amendment's Speech Clause. The First Amendment's
text does not deny protection for any specific speech topics, like relig-
ion. To the contrary, the First Amendment's juxtaposition of protec-
tions for religion and speech imply a commitment to religious
autonomy and expression free from government intrusion.218 There-
fore, legal debates considering the scope of individual religious
speech assume basic protection. Speech Clause doctrines are corre-
spondingly devised so as not to silence valuable religious speech
inadvertently. 21
9
The Court in Bellotti did not need to adopt any theory of the cor-
poration. If the First Amendment protects all speech, regardless of
the speaker's identity, then disputes about corporate theory are secon-
dary. 220 Professor Mayer is correct on one level when he considers
Bellotti's inquiries as antitheoretical exercises of constitutional opera-
tionalism that obscure the corporate theory at the heart of questions
216 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
217 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007) (opinion of Rob-
erts, C.J. & Alito, J.). To place religious conduct claims in the promised land of strict
scrutiny protection, litigators should closely examine whether any aspect of their case
involves language distinct from conduct, yet necessarily part of it.
218 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religiously Based Judgments and Discourse in Political
Life, 22 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 445, 448 (2007) ("No one proposes that anyone
can be punished or silenced for making religious arguments; indeed, guarantees of
free speech and free exercise protect such arguments.").
219 For example, principles of content neutrality determine protection without
judging the subject matter of the speech, be it religious, political, artistic, or scientific.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 190 (1983).
220 Compare Ribstein, supra note 55, at 96, 138-39 (arguing choice of theory mat-
ters), and Horwitz, supra note 47, at 175-76, with other sources cited supra note 47
(arguing that lawmakers use theory indiscriminately in service of their preferred pol-
icy ends).
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of corporate religious speech. 221 Bellottis protection test could rest
upon First Amendment theory alone to find types of protected
speech. But in another sense, theory helps understand what corpo-
rate speech is. Searching for protected speech means asking if com-
munications that corporations issue are speech. This is made
intelligible by corporate theory. Holding that corporations can speak
on many topics relies on natural entity ideas and contradicts artificial
entity and contractarian theories.
Artificial entity theory denies that corporations have purposes,
opinions, rights, or identities apart from government.222 Artificial
entity theory demands regulation of corporate speech for concerns
the Bellotti majority says nothing about: concerns, for example, like
whether the profit motive corrupts the value of speech, whether cor-
porate speech is worth risks of harms, or whether the price of entering
the marketplace justifies legal limits on groups' identities. 223 If the
Court agreed with the artificial entity theories of Justices White and
Rehnquist,224 it might either have denied corporate speaker equality
or have found a compelling state interest to overcome corporate
speech protection.225
Bellotti's idea of the corporation as an entity with identity troubles
contractarians, because they do not view corporations as entities and
believe corporate speech on behalf of divergent contractors violates
individual autonomy. No pure contractarian would confuse his theory
by arguing that the bank corporation "achieved an existence distinct
from that of its members" and "the activities of the corporation were
'modes of expression and association protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.' 226 Only natural entity theory understands how
221 See Mayer, supra note 168, at 650-51.
222 See supra Part II.A.
223 Cf Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)
(finding such concerns and permitting regulation of political speech because of the
.unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large trea-
suries"); infra Part III.D.
224 See Watts, supra note 47, at 348.
225 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J.
dissenting); id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions of both
Justices White and Rehnquist rely upon and are driven by fictional entity conceptions.
"[T]he post-Bellotti cases on corporate political speech showed that it is easier to deny
First Amendment rights if the speech is attributed to an artificial person." Ribstein,
supra note 55, at 129; see also Watts, supra note 47, at 319-20 (arguing that Austin in
1990 and Bellotti in 1978 implicitly disagree over the corporate nature); infra Part
III.D.
226 See Developments, supra note 158, at 1746 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963)); Watts, supra note 47, at 338 (arguing that Bellotti saw the corpo-
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corporate groups, like other socially valuable groups, may have multi-
ple purposes, independent identities, and self-expression rights.
2 2 7
Understanding corporations this way makes clear why Bellotti
blocked legislatures from prohibiting
speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may
represent in public debate over controversial issues [or imposing] a
requirement that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the
subject to justify communication.
If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to bus-
iness," it may also limit other corporations-religious, charitable, or
civic-to their respective "business" when addressing the public.
Such power in government to channel the expression of views is
unacceptable under the First Amendment.
228
This Note next examines the assumptions about the First Amend-
ment that support an interpretation of it so conducive to corporate
speech protection.
C. First Amendment Theory, Bellotti, and Corporate Religious Speech
Does the Court beg the First Amendment question when it allows
First Amendment protection to hinge on whether the speech at issue
is an "expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect"?
229
Does the Court say it decides on a case-by-case basis which corporate
speech accords with First Amendment values or does it decide those
values based on passing political preferences? 230 If the First Amend-
ment criterion is whether speech is valuable to society, 23 1 First
National Bank only received protection because its particular referen-
dum speech enriched democratic debate. 2 2 Litigators might push
ration as an entity "capable of being placed on equal footing with individuals as part
of the polity"); see also id. at 340-44 (arguing that Bellotti does not have a clear founda-
tion in any one corporate theory, but instead unclearly represents both artificial entity
and contractarian theories). But see Ribstein, supra note 56, at 135, 142.
227 See supra Part II.C.
228 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85.
229 Id. at 776.
230 See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SucHi THING AS FREE SPEECH 102 (1994)
(" [A] bstract concepts like free speech do not have any 'natural' content but are filled
with whatever content and direction one can manage to put into them. 'Free speech'
isjust the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish
to advance . . . . Free speech . . . is not an independent value but a political
prize . .. ").
231 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
232 See, e.g., Shelledy, supra note 194, at 542-43; Burke, supra note 189, at 376-77.
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back corporate protections if they convince the Court that corporate
voices and messages are of subordinate societal value.
233
Bellotti presupposes a great deal about how the First Amendment
works, but the foregoing interpretation misconceives BellottFs idea of
the First Amendment. The last thing Justice Powell intended was to
give a listener's veto to anyone who thinks corporate speech worthless.
Bellotti did not find First Amendment protection because it decided
the Bank had something important to say or because the use of corpo-
rate funds to buy media space threatened the existence of individual
speech. Bellotti thought all speech was inherently valuable in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, especially political speech.234 Bellottis interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment ignores private speech's quality, content,
and speaker, but spots when government silences input from certain
voices.
Bellotti's understanding of a neutral First Amendment did not
care that corporate speech may find a wide audience where individual
speech may not. "But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electo-
rate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution 'protects
expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvinc-
ing."' 235 It does not make value judgments.236 Bellotti told corpora-
tions that the kind of speech the First Amendment protects for them
is the same kind of speech it protects for individuals. Because the
individual right to free speech includes the right to speak about relig-
ion, Bellotti protects religious speech as much as the Bank's political
speech.
237
If the theory supporting Bellotts protection of corporate political
speech does not protect corporate speech on other topics, the Court
might have been wrong to indicate otherwise. 23 8 If there are concrete
233 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 168, at 633-34, 650-51; Susan L. Ross, Note, Corpo-
rate Speech on Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?, 1985
U. ILL. L. REv. 445, 454-64; see also Shelledy, supra note 194, at 551 ("[Wle should
view the First Amendment as normatively complex, embodying both private and pub-
lic ideals: one of speaker autonomy and another of public debate, sometimes comple-
menting and at other times limiting each other.").
234 Cf ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28 (1960) (arguing for the
value of free speech in order to maintain a free government).
235 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
236 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).
237 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
238 Theories play important adjudicative roles because of the textual limits of the
First Amendment. Free speech jurisprudence relies on almost entirely judge-made
law, usually in the absence of relevant historical information about the original mean-
ing of the Amendment. The protection of liberty for communications becomes intel-
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interests supporting protection of any speech, whether or not corpo-
rate, Bellotti has theoretical force. Many of the common explanations
of the First Amendment in fact explain Bellott's principles and advo-
cate for First Amendment protection of corporate religious speech.
Moreover, these principles largely overlap in their support of both
corporate religious speech and corporate political speech.
1. Traditional First Amendment Theories and Corporate Religious
Speech: Self-Realization and Democratic Participation
If the First Amendment promotes self-realization and individual
expression as the "only one true value," 239 religious corporate speech
might not gain protection if protection is contingent upon speech's
ability to promote individual self-expression. 240 If corporations are
not individuals, it might seem inapposite to consider that they could
realize their potential through self-expression.2 41 Critics of corporate
speech rights have argued that the self-realization theory is "totally for-
eign" to corporations, if corporations are understood as artificial enti-
ties or a series of contracts. 242
However, if the corporate entity is the naturally occurring prod-
uct of individual initiative and cooperation, under the natural entity
theory, then censorship of religious self-expression stifles individuals.
Individuals uniting to take part in the corporate enterprise, as share-
holders, directors, officers, and employees, have individual expressive
input into the whole corporate expression. The corporate entity also
ligible from a combination of supporting reasons, the aggregation of which often
determine case outcomes. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
785-89 (2d ed. 1988) (considering whether freedom of speech should not be con-
ceived of as a means to an end, but an "expression of the sort of society we wish to
become"); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
LJ. 877, 878-87 (1963) (considering the purposes of protections to be a combination
of theories: individual self-fulfillment, attainment of truth, participation in decision-
making, and balance between stability and change); Frederick Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 272-77 (1981) ("Free-
dom of speech need not have any one 'essential' feature. It is much more likely a
bundle of interrelated principles sharing no common set of necessary and sufficient
defining characteristics ... possib[ly] ... not reducible to any one common core.").
239 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
240 Cf Alan Hirsch & Ralph Nader, "The Corporate Conscience" and Other First Amend-
ment Follies in Pacific Gas & Electric, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 483, 486-87 (2004) (argu-
ing that self-realization may only support protections for the individual's freedom of
intellect and conscience and that corporations are unable to have the requisite indi-
vidual intellect or conscience).
241 See Ross, supra note 233, at 460.
242 See id.
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has an identity existentially expressed in the purposes and existence
given it by individuals and in its own powers of speech. These individ-
uals identify with corporate activity because it is theirs, too.24 3 Natural
entity theory demonstrates that in protecting full self-expression for
individuals, one must protect the corporate identities they form. If
profit-seeking exists alongside religious expression in a group, the
commercial character of a corporation does not nullify this self-
expressive quality.
Another philosophical objection to protecting corporate relig-
ious communication may be the theory claiming that democratic par-
ticipation is the criterion by which to judge all First Amendment
value. 244 In the political speech context, from which many of these
theoretical foundations find their origin, this criterion is a powerful
incentive for the protection of corporate political speech; Bellotti
explicitly relied upon this rationale. 24 5 However, even in that context,
Susan Ross argues that "corporations cannot vote" and "there is argua-
bly a zero-sum game between corporate and individual free
speech." 246 In her view, similar to the enhancement model discussed
below, 2 4 7 the risk of corporate speech harming public debate
demands affirmative legal limits on corporate speech. Because corpo-
rate political speech cannot satisfy the democratic criterion by being
sufficiently supportive of individual political speech, an individualisti-
cally oriented theory might find corporate religious speech even less
compatible with democracy.
243 See Fort, supra note 5, at 453 (explaining that for a religious person, "beliefs
are so fundamental to his business activities that to not speak of them would be as
phony as he is accused of appearing" (discussing LAURA L. NASH, BELIEVERS IN Busi-
NESS 124 (1994))).
244 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 234, at 24-28 (arguing from a town meeting anal-
ogy for viewpoint neutrality and central protection of political speech); Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-28 (1971)
(arguing that the political aspect is the only difference between the freedom of
speech and other freedoms and is therefore the test for protection); Harry Kalven,Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, "1964
SuP. CT. REV. 191, 204-10 (advocating the paradigm of sedition for determination of
First Amendment protection). Picturing political dissent as the only central case of
the First Amendment unduly limits the constitutional imagination from recognizing
the side-by-side priority and relationship between the freedoms of religion and
speech.
245 SeeFirst Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.l1 (1978) (citing
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-26
(1948)).
246 Ross, supra note 233, at 460, 462.
247 See infra text accompanying notes 263-71.
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However, valuing speech for its capacity to benefit public debate,
taken broadly, can support protecting all speech, including corporate
religious speech.248 Free speech in a pluralistic society is not a zero-
sum game. 249 Welcoming all informative speech potentially contem-
plates as much speech by as many speakers as are willing on as many
topics as possible. In an age where government regulation affects
nearly every facet of life, information on any topic may contribute to
policymaking. In particular, knowledge about something as socially
important as religion can only lead to more informed decisions. An
approach recognizing the unlimited opportunity for speech in a
democracy could only protect speech that advocates policy decisions
from a religious perspective. And, if policy is more broadly under-
stood, this theory could justify protection of nearly all speech, includ-
ing corporate religious speech.
2. Marketplace of Ideas Conceptions of Corporate Religious
Expression
If, as is traditionally assumed, the "best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket," all corporate ideas deserve an equal opportunity.250 The "mar-
ketplace of ideas" theory insists that all speech be legally equal speech
and none legally worthless speech. 25 1 America has a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '" 252 The nation risks
the harms that can result from false or dangerous ideas or voices.
2 5 3
248 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 91 ("[C]itizens of the United States will be
fit to govern themselves under their own institutions only if they have faced squarely
and fearlessly everything that can be said in favor of those institutions, everything that
can be said against them.").
249 Cf BERGER & NEUuWUS, supra note 132, at 41 ("[T]he process symbolized by 'E
Pluribus Unum' is not a zero-sum game. That is, the unum is not be to achieved at the
expense of the plures.").
250 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
251 SeeJoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 114 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Vail-Ballou Press 2003) (1859) ("Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so
much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites that very few have
minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach
to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between
combatants fighting under hostile banners.").
252 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
253 See MILL, supra note 251, at 114 ("When there are persons to be found, who
form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the
world is in the right, it is always probable that the dissentients have something worth
hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.").
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Protecting all speech qua speech probably underlies the Supreme
Court's commitment to protection of "expression and association
without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of
the members of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered." 254 Bellotti adopted this viewpoint when it stated that the First
Amendment risks misunderstandings. 255 No viewpoint should get dis-
favored government treatment. 256 If the marketplace of ideas indis-
criminately welcomes all voices on all topics, it welcomes corporate
religious opinions.
257
Some add that the marketplace of ideas' purpose is not merely
debate in itself, but also the discovery of truth and knowledge through
disputation. 25 8 When censorship limits the marketplace of ideas, it
limits the search for truth. So, if religious debates probe questions of
truth, 259 religious speech deserves high protection. If all speech may
help find truth, limiting the religious speech of some, like profit-seek-
ing groups, hinders this purpose.
Public choice theorists find value in the marketplace of ideas sym-
bol because they consider free information as a community commod-
ity undervalued by both the marketplace and the political system. 260
Individuals have an incentive to "free ride" because they can enjoy the
benefits of public goods without helping to produce those goods.
261
Consequently, neither market demands nor political incentives fully
capture the social value of public goods such as information. Our pol-
ity responds to this undervaluation of information by providing spe-
cial constitutional protection for information producing activities. 262
254 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).
255 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
256 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....").
257 This theory is in line with the assertion that constitutionally, nothing should
make corporate religious speech different from other corporate speech, and that all
corporate speech should be protected. See supra Part I.B.
258 SeeJoHN GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 66 (1996) (arguing that seeking
truth through speech is intrinsically good and human); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH 19-29 (1982) (examining if the marketplace of ideas causes increased
knowledge).
259 See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, FIDES ET RATIO (1998) (claiming that the end
of humanity's innate desire to question and love wisdom is knowledge of truth, which
is God).
260 See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
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Encouraging the increase of society's raw quantity of information
irrespective of society's opinion about particular speech may also jus-
tify protection of all speech. Although this "law and economics"
approach may not underlie Bellotti and Button historically, it supports
a speaker-neutral and content-neutral protection of speech, with the
same results for corporate religious speech.
However, one twist on the marketplace of ideas model neither
demands nor permits such government neutrality. The enhancement
model considers the First Amendment not as a limit on government
interference with speech, but as an authorization for government to
create conditions for high-quality civil discussion.26 3 This model rec-
ognizes that the market may leave some voices silenced, 264 generating
unfair competition of ideas and placing the costs of speech on others.
Depending on the circumstances, the enhancement model may either
stay the censor's hand or require regulation of the marketplace of
ideas. 265 If corporations seem to drown out individuals' voices, regu-
lating corporate speech may enhance civic discourse.266 If one recog-
nizes that corporations play a valuable social role in allowing
individual religious activity, then one might be less likely to argue that
the marketplace of ideas is enhanced by silencing corporate religious
speech.
Closely related to the enhancement model is the constitutional
tension method, which expands the government's obligation as man-
ager of the market to include considering how to balance other values
found in the Constitution against free speech. 26 7 Rejecting the para-
digm of "freedom or regulation," it finds constitutional values tugging
263 See Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories,
1992 Sup. CT. REV. 79, 79-80, 102-13, 115-20.
264 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 660
(1990).
265 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 263-65, 267-68,
272-76, 302, 304-09 (1992); id. at 309 ("For purposes of the Constitution, the ques-
tion is whether the speech is a contribution to social deliberation, not whether it has
political effects or sources.").
266 See Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate Speech and
the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1284 (2004) ("A close cousin of the
corporation-is-not-a-human argument is the 'little guy' argument. Freedom of speech
may be conceptualized as grounded in notions of David and Goliath, a constitutional
guarantee aimed at protecting minority viewpoints against the tyrannies of majorities,
at facilitating dissent, and at empowering the dispossessed to make their case against
those in possession." (footnote omitted)).
267 See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1987) ("[L]eft to
itself public debate will not be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide open,' but instead will
be skewed by the forces that dominate society. The state should be allowed to inter-
vene, and sometimes even required to do so ... to correct for the market.").
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in different directions. These theories permit limits on corporate
religious speech if it hurts individuals' expression, imposes social
costs, or clashes with values like nonendorsement of religion or com-
mercial regulation or equality.268 Broadly, they might condition relig-
ious corporate speech protection upon its value to society.
The counter to the enhancement and constitutional tension
models of free speech is fourfold. First, one may say the true constitu-
tional value is freedom, not censorship coated in benevolence. Sec-
ond, in the balancing of other constitutional values against
unregulated speech, speech should presumptively win because it
rarely causes serious injury269 and the First Amendment anticipates
and bears the risk of such injury.270 Third, the absolutist language of
the Speech Clause might indicate that it should categorically win
when constitutionally balanced, even if other clauses might say corpo-
rations should not express religious opinions. Fourth, the textual pre-
mise that the First Amendment, in requiring the state to abstain from
abridging speech, actually requires the government to judge, improve,
and limit speech, is attenuated. If the better interpretation seems to
be that the First Amendment means to block state regulation of
speech, legislators may not regulate corporate religious speech. 271
3. The First Amendment as a Check on the People: Fortress,
Equality, and Tolerance Theories on Corporate Religious
Speech
These last arguments rest upon a fortress theory-interpreting
the First Amendment as a structural check against state attempts,
noble or misguided, to "improve" the marketplace of ideas by "dis-
torting" how it functions. 272 It tries to halt all who censor, because
they think some form of speech is not worth protecting, be the censor
268 See Burke, supra note 189, at 388-89 (supporting a modern realignment of
speech rights, like property rights).
269 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 124 (1986) ("That speech gener-
ally causes less individual and social injury than does nonspeech behavior, while not
in itself a sufficient justification for a free speech principle such as we now have, is
nonetheless an important characteristic for explaining why speech is an appropriate
setting in which to pursue a greater capacity for tolerance.").
270 See Schneider v. NewJersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (stating that an indirect
consequence of protecting speech under the First Amendment is imposing a burden
on others). This view argues that it cannot be a compelling or substantial state inter-
est to stamp out the costs inherent in free speech in the first place.
271 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
272 See Bevier, supra note 263, at 79-80, 102-13, 115-20 (discussing differences
between enhancement and distortion models of the Free Speech Clause).
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a majority, a minority, a dissenter, or the powerless. 273 This theory
sees the main function of the First Amendment as removing decisions
over the content of speech to associations and individuals in soci-
ety. 2 7 4 It may seem unusual to consider the stereotypical powerful cor-
poration as a potential victim of the tyranny of the majority, but
corporations, large or small, like other unpopular religious speakers,
have the same right to protection from government action. 275 A for-
tress theory certainly will protect corporate religious speech from state
regulation.
Furthermore, constitutional tension theorists need not pit equal-
ity interests against free speech. Others instead find equality a driving
principle in the Speech Clause because it insists that the state main-
tain neutrality between ideas and speakers.
When government restricts only certain ideas, viewpoints, or items
of information, people wishing to express the restricted messages
receive "unequal" treatment.... For just as we "strictly scrutinize"
any law that discriminates on the basis of race, whether it denies an
important or trivial benefit, so too must we "strictly scrutinize" any
law that discriminates on the basis of content, whether it has a sub-
stantial or only a modest impact on public debate. It is the fact of
273 See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 1-2, 74-75, 82-83, 85, 203-04, 210 (1990); id. at 5 ("If the first amendment
is to have an organizing symbol . . . let it be the image of the dissenter."). But see
BOLLINGER, supra note 269, at 8-10, 120-21, 124-26; id. at 134 ("It should be borne in
mind that the tolerance principle .. . is intended and designed to perform a self-
reformation function for the general community and not . . . to offer a shield of
protection either for the majority against the government or for minorities against...
the majority.").
274 See Stone, supra note 219, at 228 ("[A]ny effort of government to restrict
speech because it conveys a 'false' or 'bad' idea is inconsistent .... [I]n a self-gov-
erning system, the people, not the government 'are entrusted with the responsibility
for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments .... '(quoting
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978))).
275 See Ribstein, supra note 55, at 124 ("As sources of significant wealth and power,
corporations are vulnerable to political manipulation. Thus, it is important to con-
sider whether corporations' power to speak out against such manipulation is pro-
tected by the First Amendment."); see also CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 235 (1993) ("Let us begin with Justice White's claim that
restrictions on corporate speech are a reasonable effort to promote corporate equal-
ity. If this is the rationale for such restrictions .... such restrictions should be invali-
dated as impermissibly selective. Many corporations are relatively poor. Many
corporations are relatively rich. A limit on corporate speech is insufficiently con-
nected to the general interest in ensuring equality in political campaigns."). But see
Mayer, supra note 168, at 605 ("[C]ommon concerns about a tyranny of the majority
are not present for the corporation.").
20081 1767
1768 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:4
discrimination, not the impact on public debate that warrants "strict
scrutiny."
2 76
Bellotti might justify equal free speech rights for corporations because
corporations are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Dis-
criminating against corporate religious speech treats religious content
and corporate speakers unequally, and for equality proponents,
impermissibly so.
277
On the other hand, equality may only be important insofar as it
promotes tolerance. If restraining innate human tendencies toward
intolerance is the end of enforced free speech, 2 78 the absolute
restraint of government interference with speech limits deci-
sionmakers' "conscious or unconscious biases that may undermine
their ability to evaluate accurately and impartially" the messages of
unpopular speakers. 279 Even if regulations come from good inten-
tions or act on unworthy speech,
the problem of the [censoring] impulse-because it cuts through a
variety of social interactions and involves a capacity for toleration in
the broadest sense-must really be confronted by creating some-
thing of an ethic against regulation, which will exert force in the
opposite direction, very much like the presumption of innocence
does in the context of the criminal jury trial. 280
The act of tolerance itself may teach the self-control needed for a soci-
ety of free speakers,2 8' especially when suppression is otherwise low-
cost or invisible to most in society.2 82 For these theorists, the very act
of abstaining from regulation of all speech-presumably including
corporate religious speech-has tolerance benefits overriding other
concerns.
276 Stone, supra note 219, at 202.
277 This Note's interpretation of tolerance principles might be at odds with the
practical suggestions potentially espoused by the proponents of tolerance. These
scholars might disagree that their equality principles support protecting corporate
religious speech, especially if they buttress their arguments with an enhancement
model. If corporations already have a disproportionate influence, government could
promote equality by restricting corporations. This Note already criticized use of that
model, however. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
278 See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 334-38
(1990) (describing the prudential and positive arguments for tolerance).
279 See Stone, supra note 219, at 225.
280 BOLLINGER, supra note 269, at 125.
281 See id. at 8-10, 120-21, 124-26, 133-36. But see David A. Strauss, Why Be Toler-
ant?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1986) (reviewing BOLLINGER, supra note 269) ("It
is not at all clear that people who are forced to tolerate speech they abhor will
become more tolerant in other contexts; they might easily become less tolerant .....
282 See Strauss, supra note 281, at 1497.
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4. Religious Pluralism and the Speech of Religious Corporations
In the end, Bellotti should not be read to exclude religious speech
when the First Amendment as a whole protects religious autonomy. 283
"Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression
of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech
that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without
the prince."28 4 The First Amendment therefore could find corporate
religious speech equal to, or more significant than, corporate political
speech.
However, if one thinks religion is purely private, one might say
religious speech protection cannot belong to corporations. If individ-
ual freedom of mind and conscience validate rights to religious
expression, only individuals, not corporations, qualify.28 5 However,
only an artificial entity model or contractarian model supports the
claim that corporate entities lack consciences, and this Note has
already argued that these models inaccurately describe the modern
corporation.2 6 Against them, natural entity theory holds that a group
conscience and the consciences of the corporation's members exist in
a corporation. The corporation itself has an identity emerging from
the uniting of individuals. Analogous conscience problems are
presented when states require corporations to act in opposition to
their identities and purposes. 28 7 "[B]usiness leaders should not cen-
sor their religious motivations .... One should not create classifica-
tions based on religion; one should not prevent the engagement of a
motivation that does have positive contributions to make to society;
and one should preserve a moral prophetic ability to critique values
that are shared."28 America's historic commitment to religious plu-
ralism should be flexible enough to accept profit-seeking religious
groups as well as traditional religious associations. What value lies in a
283 See Shelledy, supra note 194, at 548 (" [T] he Speech Clause is part of an amend-
ment that protects religious freedom as well.").
284 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
285 See Burke, supra note 189, at 371; Hirsch & Nader, supra note 240, at 485; see
also Shelledy, supra note 194, at 548 ("Because speech, assembly, and religion are all
elements of liberty grounded at least in part in individual integrity and autonomy, the
Speech and Religion Clauses can be seen in unity as safeguards of independent con-
science and individual moral sovereignty." (footnote omitted)); Mitchell C. Tilner,
Government Compulsion of Corporate Speech: Legitimate Regulation or First Amendment Viola-
tion? A Critique of PG&E v. Public Utilities Commission, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485,
486 (1987) (denying the corporate freedom of mind).
286 See supra Part 1I.
287 For more on how the corporation may have a conscience, see supra Part Il.C.3.
288 Fort, supra note 5, at 469.
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commitment to religious freedom if groups must shed their religious
beliefs or expression at the boardroom door?
This subpart has argued that the First Amendment protects cor-
porate religious speech, in theory and in fact. This Note next queries
how well these philosophical presumptions of freedom prevented
state regulation by examining how Bellotti's First Amendment protec-
tions fare in practice.
D. Subsequent Developments in Corporate Speech Cases
No Supreme Court case specifically addresses corporate religious
speech. As a result, the only clues to its protection exist in cases like
Bellotti, advocating general or full corporate speech protection.
2 9
While the Court never overruled Bellotti, the case operated in an
uncertain area for some time. 290 Corporate religious speech protec-
tions were cast in doubt when modern political speech cases carved
exceptions to Bellotti's prohibitions against speaker discrimination.
291
While recent developments show that Bellotti is here to stay, it is
important to distinguish the deviation from full-strength Bellotti pro-
tection. This exercise highlights the continued importance of corpo-
rate theory in this area of constitutional law.
Because of the complexities of the doctrinal framework of Free
Speech claims, it is not enough to say that the Speech Clause protects
(or does not protect) a form of speech without first examining the
compelling government interests the Court has historically identified
as able to surmount First Amendment protection. Under existing
case law, the strongest Speech Clause protection, a strict scrutiny anal-
ysis, finds regulations constitutional only if a compelling government
interest justifies a statute and the statute is narrowly tailored to serve
that compelling state interest. Different, highly specific compelling
government interests may ultimately justify one topical regulation
where they could not suffice for another protected subject area regu-
lation.292 Likewise, in considering intermediate scrutiny (which only
requires that a substantial government interest justify either a regula-
289 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978).
290 "In general, these cases suggest that the application of the First Amendment to
corporate speech is very much an open question." Ribstein, supra note 55, at 129.
291 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
But see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986); Consol.
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1980).
292 In equating the constitutional value of all corporate speech, including political
and religious, and in arguing that this constitutional value is high, this Note affirms
that the First Amendment requires, at the very least, application of a strict scrutiny
analysis.
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tion of expressive conduct or regulation of conduct based on time,
place, or manner), a liberal scope given to substantial government
interests has the potential to strip constitutional speech protection of
much of its force.
293
Some might argue that compelling state interests justify the regu-
lation of corporate religious speech. For example, in a future litiga-
tion setting, the government might attempt to justify WFEIA by
asserting a compelling or substantial government interest in protect-
ing a listener's workplace privacy or freedom from coercion.2 94 Pri-
vacy rights can be implicated when individuals are "captive" to speech
and the speech intrudes upon an area in which they should be free
from repeated or unwarranted invasions by the speech. 295 That right
in the WFELA setting would mean that listeners have the right to
"veto" or reject any unwanted religious communications, without risk-
ing adverse employment action from their employers. If found to be
adequate, the state interest in protecting this right would be sufficient
to overcome any statutory viewpoint-based or content-based discrimi-
nation. However, such listeners' vetoes run against the spirit of the
First Amendment and do not (yet) justify state regulation.
29 6
Cases denying political speech protection to corporations in the
last two decades strayed from Bellotti's natural entity conceptions in
the face of compelling government interests based on campaign
293 See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
294 See Secunda, supra note 22, at 210 n.8 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
21 (1971)); cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (indicating that, on behalf
of a listener, the state has the right to restrict the speech of sidewalk abortion
counselors).
295 See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) ("We there-
fore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitu-
tion or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another.").
296 See, e.g., id. at 738 ("[W]e are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech and other sounds. .. ."); cf Cohen, 403 U.S.
at 21 ("The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off dis-
course solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-
ble manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority
to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections."). For further dis-
cussion, see supra Part III.C. But see Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (justifying a speech restriction
based on the state's interest in protecting both the right to be free from unwanted
communication and the right to pass into an abortion clinic without obstruction). As
a result, WFEIA's constitutionality is instead likely to reduce to questions of (1)
whether corporations have religious speech rights, (2) whether those rights are coex-
tensive with individuals, and (3) whether a compelling government interest over-
comes the presumption of protection. For detailed discussion of these doctrinal
concepts, see supra Part III.A-C.
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finance considerations bolstered by an artificial entity theory. The
Court adopted an openly artificial entity perspective as the basis for
permissive state speech regulation, referring to the "unique state-con-
ferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasur-
ies" as its justification for speech restrictions.2 97  Freedom of
association took second place to stopping "corporate use of 'substan-
tial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
along with the corporate form of organization' and [to] protecting
individuals from corporate use of money to support candidates indi-
viduals may oppose."29 8 However, the notion that corporations are
"creatures of the state" and thus merit less constitutional protection
from the state's speech regulation relies on outdated conceptions of
the corporate form.2 9 9 The idea that wealth and power eliminates
free speech protection also runs afoul of the motivation behind the
Speech Clause.
30 0
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce30 1 reflects the height
of these cases where the Court subordinated corporate speech rights
to the compelling state interest in stopping "the corrosive and dis-
torting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas. ' 302 After Austin questioned their theoretical foundations, the
rights of corporations and groups were predictively uncertain.3 03°
For over fifteen years after Austin, the Court paid lip service to
Bellotti and mandated a strict scrutiny analysis as the supposed protec-
tion for corporate speech-while in practice it placed different values
upon different groups' political speech. This devaluing occurred
when it found in Austin that interests in preventing the corrosive
effects of corporate speech surmounted the other benefits of corpo-
297 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of Austin's deep confusion of corporate theory,
see Watts, supra note 47, at 357, 359-61, 372.
298 Ribstein, supra note 56, at 113 (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982)); see Eric L. Richards, The Jurisprudential Sin of Treating
Differents Alike: Emergence of Full First Amendment Protection for Corporate Speakers, 17 MEM-
PHIS ST. U. L. REV. 173, 218-19 (1987) (arguing for an artificial entity theory in order
to justify denying free speech rights to corporations).
299 See supra Part II.
300 See supra Part III.C.
301 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
302 Id. at 660.
303 See id. at 657 (asserting that the "mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation
does not remove its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment," but finding a
compelling interest to override free speech rights).
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rate speech to society.30 4 By the results of their analyses, Austin and its
progeny seem not to be applying the strict scrutiny test in the spirit of
Bellotti, even though the opinions professed to follow Bellotti. How-
ever, Austin's ad hoc restrictions did not profess to cover or translate
to nonpolitical religious environments even though they present diffi-
culties irreconcilable with Bellotti's understandings.
3 0 5
An analogy of the rationale of Austin to the religious square
could equally silence corporate religious speech. This rationale could
theoretically cross over from the corporate political speech realm to
the religious speech realm upon a factual showing that corporate
religious speech has a distorting effect like the distorting effect of cor-
porate political speech. Austin indicates that censorship is justified
either when a speaker invests a great deal of its money to get its mes-
sage out or when the speaker is a corporation"
6
This rationale should be avoided in a consideration of corporate
religious speech, because on its terms it gives the government a
license to silence all corporate speech.307 Restraining the voices of
some to enhance the voices of others, through discrimination on the
basis of wealth, is anathema to understanding the First Amendment as
a structural check on government to facilitate a robust marketplace of
ideas.308 If political and religious speech may be silenced, where will
the state's power end? Will corporate scientific research break-
throughs be able to be limited for fear that individuals' scientific
results will not get an audience? Free speech cannot be free from
government tinkering if one sees it as a zero-sum game, and not as an
opportunity for an abundant amount of communication.
3 0 9
304 See Watts, supra note 47, at 333 ("Austin, therefore, permitted what the Court
in Bellotti had strained to avoid-differential treatment of corporate speech and indi-
vidual speech under the First Amendment.").
305 See Ribstein, supra note 56, at 116 ("Austin's and Bellotti's polar positions can-
not both be correct.").
306 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
307 For arguments against Austin from an enhancement model theorist, see SUN-
STEIN, supra note 275, at 238-39 ("It may be legitimate to condition new corporate
benefits on new agreements to refrain from speech. But in the long history of the
corporate form, we have reason to fear that the new restrictions on that old form are
not an effort to prevent abuse of the form, but amount instead to highly selective
effort to stop businesses from speaking to the public about matters that concern
them.... It follows that a limitation on corporate speech should be treated as an
unconstitutional condition.").
308 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (" [T]he concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . ..
supra Part III.C.2-3.
309 See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
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Recently, the Roberts Court signaled its reluctance to continue
this approach and affirmed that a limit on some political speech does
not necessarily limit corporate speech on other topics. 3 10 In FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,311 the Court found that the federal govern-
ment could not justify a restriction on corporate political speech.
3 12
Nor would the Court provide corporations lesser constitutional pro-
tection than it accorded to individuals.3 13 The decision explicitly reaf-
firmed Bellotti's strict scrutiny protection of all corporate speech.
3 14
Wisconsin Right to Life limited Austin, so the state's supposed compel-
ling interest in preventing corruptive speech applies only to justify
regulating express political advocacy. 315  Chief Justice Roberts
asserted that the First Amendment protected different kinds of speech
equally; that Austin found compelling interests to overcome First
Amendment protection for one important form of speech will not
persuade the current Court to extend or adopt Austin's rationales to
allow regulation of other types of speech.
3 16
A corporate ad expressing support for the local football team could
not be regulated on the ground that such speech is less "core" than
corporate speech about an election .... A court applying strict
scrutiny must ensure that a compelling interest supports each appli-
cation of a statute restricting speech .... Such a greater-includes-
the-lesser argument would dictate that virtually all corporate speech
can be suppressed, since few kinds of speech can lay claim to being
as central to the First Amendment as campaign speech. That con-
clusion is clearly foreclosed by our precedent.
3 17
Calling the extension of Austin's rationale "a constitutional 'bait and
switch,"' the Court noted that Austin's own justifications should
instead preclude using anticorruption interests to justify the regula-
tion of other topics of speech, because Austin only permitted some
regulation if the state left corporations able to communicate on other
310 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2007) (opinion of Rob-
erts, C.J. & Alito, J.).
311 127 S. Ct. 2652.
312 See id. at 2674.
313 See id. at 2673.
314 See id. at 2660 (majority opinion); id. at 2664, 2671, 2673 (opinion of Roberts,
C.J. & Alito, J.) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778
(1978)); id. at 2677-87 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing with Justices Thomas and
Kennedy for a full return to Bellotti). This shows that the decision to change direc-
tional courses back to Bellotti, regardless of extent, commands a majority of the cur-
rent Court.
315 See id. at 2671-73 (opinion of Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.).
316 See id.
317 Id. at 2671-72 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77).
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topics. 3 18 Since Austin and its progeny's anticorruption interests will
probably not be extended by the Court, the default case on point is
Bellotti.
Bellotti governs today to prevent corporate speaker discrimina-
tion. 319 ChiefJustice Roberts, like justice Powell writing before him in
Bellotti, understands that First Amendment strict scrutiny protection
exists for all corporate speech without excluding any topics of
speech. 320 Therefore, relying on Bellotti's egalitarian protections and
the historical First Amendment protection of religious speech top-
ics,3 21 the First Amendment today defends corporate religious speech.
CONCLUSION
Because the area of corporate religious speech is new to
academia, the thesis of this Note stakes out a position likely to arouse
debate. The proliferation of case law, theories, and variables in play,
combined with the passions that the First Amendment, corporations,
and religion arouse, leave room for serious disagreement. This Note
hopes to have shaped the future debate by conducting an analytic sur-
vey showing where the fault lines of future debate may lie.
Accordingly, this Note drew attention to the important theoreti-
cal and constitutional issues facing corporations hoping to prioritize
social responsibility through religious identity. The First and Four-
teenth Amendments could and should rely on a natural entity theory
of the corporation to protect corporate religious speech from special
restrictions. These amendments entitle corporate religious speech to
constitutional armor. Examining this issue now aids corporations and
lawmakers unaware of the rights interfered with by recent legislation,
like WFEIA.
Among the three main theories of the corporation, only a natural
entity theory supports protecting corporate religious expression. The
other two theories, discredited even in the nineteenth century, rely on
inaccurate understandings of the modern corporation when they
deny that it may have rights to religious expression. Artificial entity
theory encourages heavy state regulation when it conceives of corpo-
rations as creatures of the state without independent rights or identi-
318 See id. at 2672-73 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003);
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675-78 (1990) (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
319 See id. at 2673 (opinion of Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.); supra Part III.B.
320 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77.
321 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760
(1995); supra Part III.C.
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ties. Contractarian theories think that corporations lack rights to
religious expression, because they deny that corporations exist as an
entity separate from individuals. Constitutional law should instead be
based on a theory correctly understanding corporate persons as natu-
ral entities formed by individual cooperation, which have indepen-
dent identities, expressive capacities, and institutional rights.
The Constitution relies on a natural entity theory to protect relig-
ious corporate speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Because corporations are persons for purposes of the Due Process
Clause, the liberties guaranteed to them include the same speech pro-
tections as individuals enjoy under the First Amendment. Moreover,
the First Amendment itself independently protects corporate religious
speech. Discrimination based on speaker identity finds opposition in
most theories explaining the American freedom of speech.
The best possible safeguard of corporate rights in this area would
come from judicial recognition of the corporate right to religious
expression.3 22 Even opponents of corporate protections recognize
that a reasonable court is likely to find Bill of Rights protections for
corporate freedoms.323 Until the judiciary sets out clear law protect-
ing corporate religious expression, legislators should realize that stat-
utes like WFEIA, which make it impossible for a corporation to be
religious, undercut the nation's commitment to religious pluralism.
324
They may and should protect corporate religious speech through
explicit statutory grants of protection.32 5 Corporations in turn may
322 Lee Bollinger argues that judicial guardianship alleviates society's tendency to
be intolerant of unpopular speech or speakers. "[W]hen the needs of intolerance
run extremely high, there is in the structure of free speech a means for making toler-
ance more palatable .... " BOLLINGER, supra note 269, at 136.
323 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 168, at 660-61 (proposing a constitutional amend-
ment to remove corporate Bill of Rights eligibility).
324 Absent a clear Supreme Court lead, ad hoc protection by legislatures of differ-
ing jurisdictions is one way to ensure national protection of this First Amendment
right. Congress may not expand or define the scope of Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection through its Section 5 power in contravention of the Supreme Court's determi-
nation of corporate rights, but only may create protections against the federal
government. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) ("Any suggestion
that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not supported by our case law.").
325 There are examples of well-tailored exemptions for religious persons incorpo-
rated in statutes, see Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The
Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1653; Michael J. Mazza, May a
Catholic University Have a Catholic Faculty?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. Rrv. 1329, 1356 (2003);
Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and
the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2008-10 (2007), by which courts
and legislatures limit the application of antidiscrimination statutes to some religious
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define their religious identities in the articles of incorporation or
develop a paper trail detailing their bona fide religious beliefs.
326
The law favors allowing corporations to have religious speech
rights. Still, there may be more compelling reasons for protecting
religious businesses. Religious consciousness can curb certain corpo-
rate abuses by fostering greater social responsibility. And by acting to
protect religious corporations, Americans can show that they will
make room for religious actors in all areas of society. Individuals who
want to seek profit together should not be forced to check their relig-
ious identities at the boardroom door. Instead, if America stands by
its historically robust religious pluralism, all individuals and groups-
including corporations-should be able to bring religion not only to
the public square, but also to the market square.
persons. But see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's
application to religious speech).
326 For example, note how Delaware's incorporation statutes provide: "Notice of
an intention to apply for a charter or articles of association shall ... set[] forth briefly
the character and purpose of the corporation and the kind of service to be performed
by it." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 8502(b) (2001).
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